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Message-ID: <Y4jwBahPrkwOI3w9@google.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 18:18:45 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: coverity-bot <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
linux-next@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Coverity: emulator_leave_smm(): Error handling issues
On Thu, Dec 01, 2022, coverity-bot wrote:
> Hello!
>
> This is an experimental semi-automated report about issues detected by
> Coverity from a scan of next-20221201 as part of the linux-next scan project:
> https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan
>
> You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified
> lines of code (noted below) that were touched by commits:
>
> Wed Nov 9 12:31:18 2022 -0500
> 1d0da94cdafe ("KVM: x86: do not go through ctxt->ops when emulating rsm")
>
> Coverity reported the following:
>
> *** CID 1527763: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.c:631 in emulator_leave_smm()
> 625 cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
> 626 if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
> 627 kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
> 628
> 629 /* And finally go back to 32-bit mode. */
> 630 efer = 0;
> vvv CID 1527763: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
> vvv Calling "kvm_set_msr" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 5 out of 6 times).
> 631 kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, efer);
> 632 }
> 633 #endif
> 634
> 635 /*
> 636 * Give leave_smm() a chance to make ISA-specific changes to the vCPU
>
> If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
It's not a false positive per se, but absent a KVM bug the call can never fail.
Ditto for the kvm_set_cr{0,4}() calls above. That said, I'm tempted to "fix"
these since we've had bugs related to this code in the past. This doesn't seem
too ugly...
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
index a9c1c2af8d94..621e39689bff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
@@ -601,8 +601,9 @@ int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
/* Zero CR4.PCIDE before CR0.PG. */
cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)
- kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+ if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE &&
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
/* A 32-bit code segment is required to clear EFER.LMA. */
memset(&cs_desc, 0, sizeof(cs_desc));
@@ -614,8 +615,9 @@ int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
/* For the 64-bit case, this will clear EFER.LMA. */
cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
- if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
- kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE));
+ if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE &&
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE))))
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
@@ -623,12 +625,14 @@ int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
/* Clear CR4.PAE before clearing EFER.LME. */
cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
- kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
+ if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE &&
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE)))
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
/* And finally go back to 32-bit mode. */
efer = 0;
- kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, efer);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, efer)))
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
#endif
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