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Message-ID: <7fd0bddb-a9c4-e8cc-66c6-0cc9c3956c91@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2022 08:10:05 +0530
From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@...cle.com>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc: harshit.m.mogalapalli@...il.com, george.kennedy@...cle.com,
darren.kenny@...cle.com, syzkaller <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>,
io-uring@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
vegard.nossum@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] io_uring: Fix a null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb()
On 07/12/22 2:45 am, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 12/6/22 2:38?AM, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
>> Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:
>>
>> BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>> Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955
>>
>> CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
>> Call Trace:
>> <TASK>
>> dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
>> ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>> kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
>> ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>> kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
>> io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
>> task_work_run+0x164/0x250
>> ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
>> get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
>> ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
>> ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
>> ? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
>> ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
>> ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
>> arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
>> ? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
>> ? putname+0xfe/0x140
>> ? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
>> ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
>> ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
>> ? putname+0xfe/0x140
>> ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
>> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
>> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
>> do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>> RIP: 0023:0x0
>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>> RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
>> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
>> RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
>> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
>> </TASK>
>> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
>>
>> Add a NULL check on tctx to prevent this.
>
> I agree with Vegard that I don't think this is fixing the core of
> the issue. I think what is happening here is that we don't run the
> task_work in io_uring_cancel_generic() unconditionally, if we don't
> need to in the loop above. But we do need to ensure we run it before
> we clear current->io_uring.
>
> Do you have a reproducer? If so, can you try the below? I _think_
> this is all we need. We can't be hitting the delayed fput path as
> the task isn't exiting, and we're dealing with current here.
>
>
Thanks Jens and Vegard for the suggestions and analysis.
Yes, the below patch silences the reproducer.
> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> index 36cb63e4174f..4791d94c88f5 100644
> --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
> +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> @@ -3125,6 +3125,15 @@ __cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd)
>
> io_uring_clean_tctx(tctx);
> if (cancel_all) {
> + /*
> + * If we didn't run task_work in the loop above, ensure we
> + * do so here. If an fput() queued up exit task_work for the
> + * ring descriptor before we started the exec that led to this
> + * cancelation, then we need to have that run before we proceed
> + * with tearing down current->io_uring.
> + */
> + io_run_task_work();
> +
> /*
> * We shouldn't run task_works after cancel, so just leave
> * ->in_idle set for normal exit.
>
Thanks,
Harshit
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