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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRBMTQvnBdSwMbkOsk9eemYfvCmj9TRgxtMeuex4KLCPA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 13:29:08 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: jeffxu@...omium.org
Cc: skhan@...uxfoundation.org, keescook@...omium.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@...il.com,
dverkamp@...omium.org, hughd@...gle.com, jeffxu@...gle.com,
jorgelo@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
jannh@...gle.com, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 6/6] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create
On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <jeffxu@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> security/security.c | 5 +++++
> 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
perspective.
--
paul-moore.com
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