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Message-ID: <6eed73b1-adee-caf7-e02f-4d2b08f1aefe@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:17:02 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES
On 12/9/22 05:25, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> == Background ==
>
> There is a class of side-channel attacks against SGX enclaves called
> "SGX Step"[1]. These attacks create lots of exceptions inside of
> enclaves. Basically, run an in-enclave instruction, cause an exception.
> Over and over.
>
> There is a concern that a VMM could attack a TDX guest in the same way
> by causing lots of #VE's. The TDX architecture includes new
> countermeasures for these attacks. It basically counts the number of
> exceptions and can send another *special* exception once the number of
> VMM-induced #VE's hits a critical threshold[2].
>
> == Problem ==
>
> But, these special exceptions are independent of any action that the
> guest takes. They can occur anywhere that the guest executes. This
> includes sensitive areas like the entry code. The (non-paranoid) #VE
> handler is incapable of handling exceptions in these areas.
>
> == Solution ==
>
> Fortunately, the special exceptions can be disabled by the guest via
> write to NOTIFY_ENABLES TDCS field. NOTIFY_ENABLES is disabled by
> default, but might be enabled by a bootloader, firmware or an earlier
> kernel before the current kernel runs.
>
> Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES feature explicitly and unconditionally. Any
> NOTIFY_ENABLES-based #VE's that occur before this point will end up
> in the early #VE exception handler and die due to unexpected exit
> reason.
>
> [1] https://github.com/jovanbulck/sgx-step
> [2] https://intel.github.io/ccc-linux-guest-hardening-docs/security-spec.html#safety-against-ve-in-kernel-code
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
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