linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH hid v12 05/15] HID: bpf jmp table: simplify the logic of cleaning up programs

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Message-ID: <Y5gbg820K5LHI7K6@kroah.com>
Date:   Tue, 13 Dec 2022 07:28:19 +0100
From:   Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     Yonghong Song <yhs@...a.com>
Cc:     Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@...hat.com>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Tero Kristo <tero.kristo@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-input@...r.kernel.org,
        bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH hid v12 05/15] HID: bpf jmp table: simplify the logic of
 cleaning up programs

On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 10:39:26AM -0800, Yonghong Song wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/12/22 10:20 AM, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 09:52:03AM -0800, Yonghong Song wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On 12/12/22 9:02 AM, Benjamin Tissoires wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 4:58 PM Benjamin Tissoires
> > > > <benjamin.tissoires@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Kind of a hack, but works for now:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Instead of listening for any close of eBPF program, we now
> > > > > decrement the refcount when we insert it in our internal
> > > > > map of fd progs.
> > > > > 
> > > > > This is safe to do because:
> > > > > - we listen to any call of destructor of programs
> > > > > - when a program is being destroyed, we disable it by removing
> > > > >     it from any RCU list used by any HID device (so it will never
> > > > >     be called)
> > > > > - we then trigger a job to cleanup the prog fd map, but we overwrite
> > > > >     the removal of the elements to not do anything on the programs, just
> > > > >     remove the allocated space
> > > > > 
> > > > > This is better than previously because we can remove the map of known
> > > > > programs and their usage count. We now rely on the refcount of
> > > > > bpf, which has greater chances of being accurate.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@...hat.com>
> > > > > 
> > > > > ---
> > > > 
> > > > So... I am a little bit embarrassed, but it turns out that this hack
> > > > is not safe enough.
> > > > 
> > > > If I compile the kernel with LLVM=1, the function
> > > > bpf_prog_put_deferred() is optimized in a weird way: if we are not in
> > > > irq, the function is inlined into __bpf_prog_put(), but if we are, the
> > > > function is still kept around as it is called in a scheduled work
> > > > item.
> > > > 
> > > > This is something I completely overlooked: I assume that if the
> > > > function would be inlined, the HID entrypoint BPF preloaded object
> > > > would not be able to bind, thus deactivating HID-BPF safely. But if a
> > > > function can be both inlined and not inlined, then I have no
> > > > guarantees that my cleanup call will be called. Meaning that a HID
> > > > device might believe there is still a bpf function to call. And things
> > > > will get messy, with kernel crashes and others.
> > > 
> > > You should not rely fentry to a static function. This is unstable
> > > as compiler could inline it if that static function is called
> > > directly. You could attach to a global function if it is not
> > > compiled with lto.
> > 
> > But now that the kernel does support LTO, how can you be sure this will
> > always work properly?  The code author does not know if LTO will kick in
> > and optimize this away or not, that's the linker's job.
> 
> Ya, that is right. So for in-kernel bpf programs, attaching to global
> functions are not safe either. For other not-in-kernel bpf programs, it
> may not work but that is user's responsibility to adjust properly
> (to different functions based on a particular build, etc.).

So if in-kernel bpf programs will not work or are not safe, how will
in-kernel bpf programs properly attach?

confused,

greg k-h