Message-ID: <1c51910a35a1d113256494827fd66ccc7473632e.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu, 15 Dec 2022 14:58:36 -0500
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        "paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "pvorel@...e.cz" <pvorel@...e.cz>,
        "noodles@...com" <noodles@...com>, "tiwai@...e.de" <tiwai@...e.de>,
        Kanth Ghatraju <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>,
        Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/10] Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 16:26 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
> > On Dec 15, 2022, at 3:21 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Tue, 2022-12-13 at 19:33 -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> Prior to the introduction of the machine keyring, most distros simply 
> >> allowed all keys contained within the platform keyring to be used
> >> for both kernel and module verification.  This was done by an out of
> >> tree patch.  Some distros took it even further and loaded all these keys
> >> into the secondary trusted keyring.  This also allowed the system owner 
> >> to add their own key for IMA usage.
> >> 
> >> Each distro contains similar documentation on how to sign kernel modules
> >> and enroll the key into the MOK.  The process is fairly straightforward.
> >> With the introduction of the machine keyring, the process remains
> >> basically the same, without the need for any out of tree patches.
> >> 
> >> The machine keyring allowed distros to eliminate the out of tree patches
> >> for kernel module signing.  However, it falls short in allowing the end 
> >> user to add their own keys for IMA. Currently the machine keyring can not 
> >> be used as another trust anchor for adding keys to the ima keyring, since 
> >> CA enforcement does not currently exist.  This would expand the current 
> >> integrity gap. The IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY 
> >> Kconfig states that keys may be added to the ima keyrings if the key is 
> >> validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or secondary trusted 
> >> keyring.  Currently there is not code that enforces the contents of a
> >> CA cert. Any key in the builtin or secondary keyring can be used. 
> >> 
> >> To allow IMA to be enabled with the machine keyring, this series introduces
> >> enforcement of key usage in the certificate. This series also applies
> >> this enforcement across all kernel keyrings.
> >> 
> >> The machine keyring shares  similarities with both the builtin and
> >> secondary keyrings.  Similar to the builtin, no keys may be added to the
> >> machine keyring following boot. The secondary keyring allows user
> >> provided keys to be added following boot; however, a previously enrolled
> >> kernel key must vouch for the key before it may be included. The system
> >> owner may include their own keys into the machine keyring prior to boot.
> >> If the end-user is not the system owner, they may not add their own keys
> >> to the machine keyring.  
> >> 
> >> The machine keyring is only populated when Secure Boot is enabled.  A
> >> system owner has the ability to control the entire Secure Boot keychain
> >> (PK, KEK, DB, and DBX).  The system owner can also turn Secure Boot off.
> >> With this control, they may use insert-sys-cert to include their own key 
> >> and re-sign their kernel and have it boot.  The system owner also has 
> >> control to include or exclude MOK keys. This series does not try to 
> >> interpret how a system owner has configured their machine.  If the system 
> >> owner has taken the steps to add their own MOK keys, they will be 
> >> included in the machine keyring and used for verification, exactly 
> >> the same way as keys contained in the builtin and secondary keyrings.
> >> Since the system owner has the ability to add keys before booting to
> >> either the machine or builtin keyrings, it is viewed as inconsequential 
> >> if the key originated from one or the other.
> >> 
> >> This series introduces two different ways to configure the machine keyring.
> >> By default, nothing changes and all MOK keys are loaded into it.  Whenever
> >> a CA cert is found within the machine, builtin, or secondary, a flag 
> >> indicating this is stored in the public key struct.  The other option is 
> >> if the new Kconfig INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING is enabled, only CA certs 
> >> will be loaded into the machine keyring. All remaining MOK keys will be 
> >> loaded into the platform keyring.
> >> 
> >> A CA cert shall be defined as any X509 certificate that contains the 
> >> keyCertSign key usage and has the CA bit set to true.
> > 
> > Hi Eric,
> > 
> > Allowing CA certificates with the digitalSignature key usage flag
> > enabled defeats the purpose of the new Kconfig.  Please update the
> > above definition to exclude the digitalSignature key usage flag and
> > modify the code accordingly.
> 
> Within v2, the request was made to allow Intermediate CA certificates to be 
> loaded directly.  The Intermediate CA referenced was the one used by kernel.org.  
> This Intermediate CA contains both digitalSignature and keyCertSign.  If the code 
> is changed to exclude this certificate, now the root CA has to be loaded again.  Is that 
> the intent?

That definitely was not the intent.  Nor would it address the issue of
a particular intermediate CA certificate having both keyCertSign and
digitalSignature.

thanks,

Mimi

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