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Message-ID: <3a5a4738-2868-8f2f-f8b2-a28c10fbe25b@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 10:42:39 +0800
From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@...edance.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
syzbot <syzbot+b8e8c01c8ade4fe6e48f@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: acme@...nel.org, alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, jolsa@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
mark.rutland@....com, mingo@...hat.com, namhyung@...nel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: use-after-free Read in put_pmu_ctx
On 2022/12/19 22:40, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 19, 2022 at 12:04:43AM -0800, syzbot wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>
>> HEAD commit: 13e3c7793e2f Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel...
>> git tree: bpf
>> console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=177df7e0480000
>> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b0e91ad4b5f69c47
>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b8e8c01c8ade4fe6e48f
>> compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
>> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=15e87100480000
>> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=16ceeb13880000
>>
>> Downloadable assets:
>> disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/373a99daa295/disk-13e3c779.raw.xz
>> vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/7fa71ed0fe17/vmlinux-13e3c779.xz
>> kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/2842ad5c698b/bzImage-13e3c779.xz
>>
>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>> Reported-by: syzbot+b8e8c01c8ade4fe6e48f@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3ee7/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4925
>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880237d6018 by task syz-executor287/8300
>>
>> CPU: 0 PID: 8300 Comm: syz-executor287 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-09661-g13e3c7793e2f #0
>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
>> Call Trace:
>> <TASK>
>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
>> dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
>> print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
>> print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395
>> kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
>> __lock_acquire+0x3ee7/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4925
>> lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
>> lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
>> __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
>> _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
>> put_pmu_ctx kernel/events/core.c:4913 [inline]
>> put_pmu_ctx+0xad/0x390 kernel/events/core.c:4893
>> _free_event+0x3c5/0x13d0 kernel/events/core.c:5196
>> free_event+0x58/0xc0 kernel/events/core.c:5224
>> __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x66d/0x2980 kernel/events/core.c:12701
>> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
>> do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>
> Does this help?
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index e47914ac8732..bbff551783e1 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -12689,7 +12689,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> return event_fd;
>
> err_context:
> - /* event->pmu_ctx freed by free_event() */
> + put_pmu_ctx(event->pmu_ctx);
> + event->pmu_ctx = NULL; /* _free_event() */
> err_locked:
> mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
> perf_unpin_context(ctx);
Tested-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@...edance.com>
While reviewing the code, I found perf_event_create_kernel_counter()
has the similar problem in the "err_pmu_ctx" error handling path:
CPU0 CPU1
perf_event_create_kernel_counter()
// inc ctx refcnt
find_get_context(task, event) (1)
// inc pmu_ctx refcnt
pmu_ctx = find_get_pmu_context()
event->pmu_ctx = pmu_ctx
...
goto err_pmu_ctx:
// dec pmu_ctx refcnt
put_pmu_ctx(pmu_ctx) (2)
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex)
// dec ctx refcnt
put_ctx(ctx)
perf_event_exit_task_context()
mutex_lock()
mutex_unlock()
// last refcnt put
put_ctx()
free_event(event)
if (event->pmu_ctx) // True
put_pmu_ctx() (3)
// will access freed pmu_ctx or ctx
if (event->ctx) // False
put_ctx()
(3) has UAF problem since the pmu_ctx maybe freed in (2), so also
should have "event->pmu_ctx = NULL;" in (2).
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