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Message-ID: <70872206-7a75-0a19-3df5-a97207e710fa@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 18:30:20 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: nVMX: Don't muck with allowed sec exec
controls on CPUID changes
On 12/13/22 07:23, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Don't modify the set of allowed secondary execution controls, i.e. the
> virtual MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, in response to guest CPUID changes.
> To avoid breaking old userspace that never sets the VMX MSRs, i.e. relies
> on KVM to provide a consistent vCPU model, keep the existing behavior if
> userspace has never written MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2.
>
> KVM should not modify the VMX capabilities presented to L1 based on CPUID
> as doing so may discard explicit settings provided by userspace. E.g. if
> userspace does KVM_SET_MSRS => KVM_SET_CPUID and disables a feature in
> the VMX MSRs but not CPUID (to prevent exposing the feature to L2), then
> stuffing the VMX MSRs during KVM_SET_CPUID will expose the feature to L2
> against userspace's wishes.
The commit message doesn't explain *why* KVM_SET_CPUID would be done
before KVM_SET_MSRS. The presence of certain MSRs or bits within is
signaled by CPUID bits, and even though KVM is more lenient on
host-initiated MSR writes it still verifies in general that the bits are
valid.
For now I applied patch 1 and (with a reworded comment) patch 2. I'm
not opposed to the rest, but I would like to better understand the
reason for them. (If it has been reported to the mailing list, please
add a "Link" trailer too).
Paolo
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