Message-ID: <61C653C2-A972-40DB-9738-B418A1C601FC@oracle.com>
Date:   Fri, 23 Dec 2022 18:17:47 +0000
From:   Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
CC:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        "paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "pvorel@...e.cz" <pvorel@...e.cz>,
        "noodles@...com" <noodles@...com>, "tiwai@...e.de" <tiwai@...e.de>,
        Kanth Ghatraju <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>,
        Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/10] Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions



> On Dec 23, 2022, at 9:34 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 2022-12-23 at 16:13 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> 
>>> On Dec 22, 2022, at 8:41 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Thu, 2022-12-22 at 15:15 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On Dec 21, 2022, at 12:01 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, 2022-12-21 at 18:27 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2022, at 5:21 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Fri, 2022-12-16 at 22:06 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi Eric and Mimi,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 15, 2022 at 09:45:37PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A CA cert shall be defined as any X509 certificate that contains the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keyCertSign key usage and has the CA bit set to true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Eric,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Allowing CA certificates with the digitalSignature key usage flag
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enabled defeats the purpose of the new Kconfig.  Please update the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> above definition to exclude the digitalSignature key usage flag and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modify the code accordingly.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Within v2, the request was made to allow Intermediate CA certificates to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> loaded directly.  The Intermediate CA referenced was the one used by kernel.org.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This Intermediate CA contains both digitalSignature and keyCertSign.  If the code
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is changed to exclude this certificate, now the root CA has to be loaded again.  Is that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the intent?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> That definitely was not the intent.  Nor would it address the issue of
>>>>>>>>>>>> a particular intermediate CA certificate having both keyCertSign and
>>>>>>>>>>>> digitalSignature.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry, I’m not following.  Why is it an issue that an intermediate CA certificate contains
>>>>>>>>>>> both keyCertSign and digitalSignature? Why would we want to exclude an Intermediate
>>>>>>>>>>> CA cert like the one used on kernel.org?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I must be missing something.  Isn't the purpose of "keyUsage" to
>>>>>>>>>> minimize how a certificate may be used?   Why would we want the same
>>>>>>>>>> certificate to be used for both certificate signing and code signing?
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Every 3rd party intermediate CA I have looked at so far contains both set. Most have CRLSign set.
>>>>>>>>> Typically the root CA contains keyCertSign and CRLSign, but some also have digitalSignature
>>>>>>>>> set.  Finding a 3rd party Intermediate CA without digitalSignature set is probably going to be
>>>>>>>>> challenging and will severely limit usage.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> How about allowing both keyCertSign and digitalSignature asserted but
>>>>>>>> issuing a warning for this case?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Here's my rationale for this proposal.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I assume we should conform to some X.509 specifications. So I checked
>>>>>>>> "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
>>>>>>>> Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [1] and ITU-T X.509 (2012-10)
>>>>>>>> [2].
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> [1] states in 4.2.1.3. Key Usage,
>>>>>>>> "If the keyUsage extension is present, then the subject public key
>>>>>>>> MUST NOT be used to verify signatures on certificates or CRLs unless
>>>>>>>> the corresponding keyCertSign or cRLSign bit is set.  If the subject
>>>>>>>> public key is only to be used for verifying signatures on
>>>>>>>> certificates and/or CRLs, then the digitalSignature and
>>>>>>>> nonRepudiation bits SHOULD NOT be set.  However, the digitalSignature
>>>>>>>> and/or nonRepudiation bits MAY be set in addition to the keyCertSign
>>>>>>>> and/or cRLSign bits if the subject public key is to be used to verify
>>>>>>>> signatures on certificates and/or CRLs as well as other objects."
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> and [2] states in 8.2.2.3 Key usage extension that,
>>>>>>>> "More than one bit may be set in an instance of the keyUsage extension.
>>>>>>>> The setting of multiple bits shall not change the meaning of each
>>>>>>>> individual bit but shall indicate that the certificate may be used for
>>>>>>>> all of the purposes indicated by the set bits. There may be risks
>>>>>>>> incurred when setting multiple bits. A review of those risks is
>>>>>>>> documented in Annex I."
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I interpret the above texts as we should allow both keyCertSign and
>>>>>>>> digitalSignature. However [2] warns about the risks of setting multiple
>>>>>>>> bits. Quoting Annex I,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> "Combining the contentCommitment bit in the keyUsage certificate
>>>>>>>> extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications
>>>>>>>> depending on the security environment in which the certificate is to be
>>>>>>>> used. If the subject's environment can be fully controlled and trusted,
>>>>>>>> then there are no specific security implications. For example, in cases
>>>>>>>> where the subject is fully confident about exactly which data is signed
>>>>>>>> or cases where the subject is fully confident about the security
>>>>>>>> characteristics of the authentication protocol being used. If the
>>>>>>>> subject's environment is not fully controlled or not fully trusted, then
>>>>>>>> unintentional signing of commitments is possible. Examples include the
>>>>>>>> use of badly formed authentication exchanges and the use of a rogue
>>>>>>>> software component. If untrusted environments are used by a subject,
>>>>>>>> these security implications can be limited through use of the following
>>>>>>>> measures:   
>>>>>>>> – to not combine the contentCommitment key usage setting in
>>>>>>>>   certificates with any other key usage setting and to use the
>>>>>>>>   corresponding private key only with this certificate;   
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> – to limit the use of private keys associated with certificates that
>>>>>>>>   have the contentCommitment key usage bit set, to environments which
>>>>>>>>   are considered adequately controlled and trustworthy"
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> So maybe it's useful to add a warning if both keyCertSign and
>>>>>>>> digitalSignature are asserted.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Coiby, thank you for adding these details.  I was hoping others would
>>>>>>> chime in as well.  I agree at minimum there should be a warning.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> A warning could be added.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Perhaps instead of making INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING dependent on
>>>>>>> INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING, make them a Kconfig "choice" to support the
>>>>>>> more restrictive certificate use case requirements:  all certificates,
>>>>>>> CA certificate signing and digital signature, only CA certificate
>>>>>>> signing.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> As could support for additional restrictions.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Would these additions be required within this series? What is missing from this 
>>>>>> discussion is why would these additions be necessary?  Why should the kernel 
>>>>>> enforce a restriction that is beyond the scope of the X.509 spec?  If a warning was 
>>>>>> to be added, what would be the justification for adding this additional code?  From 
>>>>>> my research every single 3rd party code signing intermediate CA would be flagged 
>>>>>> with the warning.  Isn’t this just going to cause confusion?  Or is there a benefit that 
>>>>>> I am missing that needs to be stated?
>>>>> 
>>>>> You're focusing on third party kernel modules and forgetting about the
>>>>> simple use case of allowing an end user (or business) to sign their own
>>>>> code.  True they could use the less restrictive CA certificates, but it
>>>>> is unnecessary.
>>>> 
>>>> My focus is on signing user-space applications, as outlined in the cover letter.  This 
>>>> series has nothing to do with kernel modules.  Most end-users and businesses rely on 
>>>> a third party to deal with code signing.  All third party code signing services I have 
>>>> found use an intermediate CA containing more than just the keyCertSign usage set.  
>>>> It seems to be an industry accepted practice that does not violate the spec. Before writing
>>>> new code to either warn or exclude a third party intermediate CA,  I would like to understand 
>>>> the motivation behind this request.
>>> 
>>> In older discussions there are comments like, "Any CA certificate, no
>>> matter if it's a root or an intermediate, must have the keyCertSign
>>> extension. If you want to sign a revocation list (CRL) with the CA
>>> certificate as well (you usually do want that), than you have to add
>>> cRLSign as well. Any other keyUsages can and should be avoided for CA
>>> certificates."
>>> 
>>> The question as to "why" this changed to include "digitalSignature" was
>>> posed here [2] with the response being for "OCSP".   It also includes a
>>> link to Entrusts root and intermediate CAs with just keyCertSign and
>>> cRLSign keyUsages.
>>> 
>>> The matchine keyring is a means of establishing a new root of trust. 
>>> The motivation for further restricting CA certificates to just
>>> keyCertSign and cRLSign keyUsages is to limit how the CA certificates
>>> may be used.  They should not be used for code signing.
>> 
>> Fair enough.  If this will be viewed as justification for adding the additional 
>> code, I can work on adding it.  Above you mentioned a warning would be needed 
>> at a minimum and a restriction could be placed behind a Kconfig.  How about for 
>> the default case I add the warning and when compiling with 
>> INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING the restriction will be enforced.
> 
> Sounds good to me.  To avoid misunderstandings, will there be a Kconfig
> menu with 3 options?  

I will add the three options in the next round.

> There were a couple of other comments having to
> do with variable names.  Will you address them as well?

And take care of the variable name changes.  I won’t get back to this until January.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists