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Message-Id: <20221229203708.13628-2-vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 21:37:03 +0100
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@...hat.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>, Elliott Robert <elliott@....com>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Vladis Dronov <vdronov@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/6] crypto: xts - restrict key lengths to approved values in FIPS mode
From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
According to FIPS 140-3 IG C.I., only (total) key lengths of either
256 bits or 512 bits are allowed with xts(aes). Make xts_verify_key() to
reject anything else in FIPS mode.
As xts(aes) is the only approved xts() template instantiation in FIPS mode,
the new restriction implemented in xts_verify_key() effectively only
applies to this particular construction.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
---
include/crypto/xts.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/crypto/xts.h b/include/crypto/xts.h
index 0f8dba69feb4..a233c1054df2 100644
--- a/include/crypto/xts.h
+++ b/include/crypto/xts.h
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ static inline int xts_verify_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
if (keylen % 2)
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * In FIPS mode only a combined key length of either 256 or
+ * 512 bits is allowed, c.f. FIPS 140-3 IG C.I.
+ */
+ if (fips_enabled && keylen != 32 && keylen != 64)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* ensure that the AES and tweak key are not identical */
if ((fips_enabled || (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS)) &&
--
2.38.1
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