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Date:   Thu, 5 Jan 2023 12:54:06 +0100
From:   Daniel Vetter <daniel@...ll.ch>
To:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc:     Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Daniel Vetter <daniel@...ll.ch>, Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
        Linux Fbdev development list <linux-fbdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        DRI <dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fbcon: Use kzalloc() in fbcon_prepare_logo()

On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at 04:52:14PM +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at 3:03 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> >
> > On 2022/12/15 18:36, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> > > The next line is:
> > >
> > >         scr_memsetw(save, erase, array3_size(logo_lines, new_cols, 2));
> > >
> > > So how can this turn out to be uninitialized later below?
> > >
> > >         scr_memcpyw(q, save, array3_size(logo_lines, new_cols, 2));
> > >
> > > What am I missing?
> >
> > Good catch. It turned out that this was a KMSAN problem (i.e. a false positive report).
> >
> > On x86_64, scr_memsetw() is implemented as
> >
> >         static inline void scr_memsetw(u16 *s, u16 c, unsigned int count)
> >         {
> >                 memset16(s, c, count / 2);
> >         }
> >
> > and memset16() is implemented as
> >
> >         static inline void *memset16(uint16_t *s, uint16_t v, size_t n)
> >         {
> >                 long d0, d1;
> >                 asm volatile("rep\n\t"
> >                              "stosw"
> >                              : "=&c" (d0), "=&D" (d1)
> >                              : "a" (v), "1" (s), "0" (n)
> >                              : "memory");
> >                 return s;
> >         }
> >
> > . Plain memset() in arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h is redirected to __msan_memset()
> > but memsetXX() are not redirected to __msan_memsetXX(). That is, memory initialization
> > via memsetXX() results in KMSAN's shadow memory being not updated.
> >
> > KMSAN folks, how should we fix this problem?
> > Redirect assembly-implemented memset16(size) to memset(size*2) if KMSAN is enabled?
> >
> 
> I think the easiest way to fix it would be disable memsetXX asm
> implementations by something like:
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h
> index 888731ccf1f67..5fb330150a7d1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n);
>  #endif
>  void *__memset(void *s, int c, size_t n);
> 
> +#if !defined(__SANITIZE_MEMORY__)
>  #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16
>  static inline void *memset16(uint16_t *s, uint16_t v, size_t n)
>  {
> @@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ static inline void *memset64(uint64_t *s, uint64_t
> v, size_t n)
>                      : "memory");
>         return s;
>  }
> +#endif

So ... what should I do here? Can someone please send me a revert or patch
to apply. I don't think I should do this, since I already tossed my credit
for not looking at stuff carefully enough into the wind :-)
-Daniel

> 
>  #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
>  #if defined(__SANITIZE_MEMORY__) && defined(__NO_FORTIFY)
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> This way we'll just pick the existing C implementations instead of
> reinventing them.
> 
> 
> -- 
> Alexander Potapenko
> Software Engineer
> 
> Google Germany GmbH
> Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
> 80636 München
> 
> Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Liana Sebastian
> Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
> Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg

-- 
Daniel Vetter
Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
http://blog.ffwll.ch

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