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Message-ID: <Y7sfdxJ5/2DSQK/l@zn.tnic>
Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2023 20:55:06 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Disable kernel stack offset randomization for !TSC
On Sun, Jan 08, 2023 at 07:42:54PM +0000, Maciej W. Rozycki wrote:
> For x86 kernel stack offset randomization uses the RDTSC instruction,
> which causes an invalid opcode exception with hardware that does not
> implement this instruction:
Out of pure curiosity, what hw is that?
Also, I guess the fix should be something like this instead:
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 117903881fe4..57b372ca6ce7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
* Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
* 6 (ia32) bits.
*/
- choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
}
#define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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