linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] x86: Disable kernel stack offset randomization for !TSC

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.2301082113350.65308@angie.orcam.me.uk>
Date:   Sun, 8 Jan 2023 21:26:11 +0000 (GMT)
From:   "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86: Disable kernel stack offset randomization for !TSC

For x86 kernel stack offset randomization uses the RDTSC instruction, 
which causes an invalid opcode exception with hardware that does not 
implement this instruction:

process '/sbin/init' started with executable stack
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1]
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #1
EIP: exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x90/0xe1
Code: 30 02 00 75 ad 0f ba e3 16 73 05 e8 a7 a5 fc ff 0f ba e3 0e 73 05 e8 3e af fc ff a1 c4 c6 51 c0 85 c0 7e 13 8b 0d ac 01 53 c0 <0f> 31 0f b6 c0 31 c1 89 0d ac 01 53 c0 83 3d 30 ed 62 c0 00 75 33
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 00004000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 000004ff
ESI: c10253c0 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c1027f98 ESP: c1027f8c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010002
CR0: 80050033 CR2: bfe8659b CR3: 012e0000 CR4: 00000000
Call Trace:
 ? rest_init+0x72/0x72
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15/0x27
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
EIP: 0xb7f74800
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xb7f747d6.
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfe864b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000200
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
EIP: exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x90/0xe1
Code: 30 02 00 75 ad 0f ba e3 16 73 05 e8 a7 a5 fc ff 0f ba e3 0e 73 05 e8 3e af fc ff a1 c4 c6 51 c0 85 c0 7e 13 8b 0d ac 01 53 c0 <0f> 31 0f b6 c0 31 c1 89 0d ac 01 53 c0 83 3d 30 ed 62 c0 00 75 33
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 00004000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 000004ff
ESI: c10253c0 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c1027f98 ESP: c1027f8c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010002
CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7f747d6 CR3: 012e0000 CR4: 00000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Therefore do not use randomization where the CPU does not have the TSC 
feature.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@...am.me.uk>
---
Changes from v1:

- Disable randomization at run time rather than in configuration.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

linux-x86-randomize-kstack-offset-tsc.diff
Index: linux-macro/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
===================================================================
--- linux-macro.orig/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ linux-macro/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/api.h>
@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mod
 	 * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
 	 * 6 (ia32) bits.
 	 */
-	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+		choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare