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Message-ID: <Y7xbC+leVdO0TRVE@google.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 18:20:59 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
shuah@...nel.org, bgardon@...gle.com, oupton@...gle.com,
peterx@...hat.com, vkuznets@...hat.com, dmatlack@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [V4 PATCH 4/4] KVM: selftests: x86: Invoke kvm hypercall as per
host cpu
KVM: selftests: Use host's native hypercall instruction in kvm_hypercall()
On Wed, Dec 28, 2022, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> Invoke vmcall/vmmcall instructions from kvm_hypercall as per host CPU
() for functions, i.e. kvm_hypercall().
> type.
s/type/vendor, "type" is too generic.
> CVMs and current kvm_hyerpcall callers need to execute hypercall
CVM isn't a not ubiquitous acronym. I would avoid it entirely because "CVM"
doesn't strictly imply memory encryption, e.g. KVM could still patch the guest in
a pKVM-like implementation.
Use the host CPU's native hypercall instruction, i.e. VMCALL vs. VMMCALL,
in kvm_hypercall(), as relying on KVM to patch in the native hypercall on
a #UD for the "wrong" hypercall requires KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN
to be enabled and flat out doesn't work if guest memory is encrypted with
a private key, e.g. for SEV VMs.
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