Message-ID: <CAOnJCUKHe2yTUET4D6k9pFH-g6mYwjdbKUAo9Kxm3_UoT-LwRQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:38:15 -0800
From:   Atish Patra <atishp@...shpatra.org>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org List" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Beeman Strong <beeman@...osinc.com>,
        Atish Patra <atishp@...osinc.com>,
        Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Anup Patel <apatel@...tanamicro.com>
Subject: Re: Expected rdpmc behavior during context swtich and a RISC-V conundrum

On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 7:26 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 09, 2023 at 01:06:45AM -0800, Atish Patra wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 4:02 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Jan 05, 2023 at 11:59:24AM -0800, Atish Patra wrote:
> > > > Hi All,
> > > > There was a recent uabi update[1] for RISC-V that allows the users to
> > > > read cycle and instruction count without any checks.
> > > > We tried to restrict that behavior to address security concerns
> > > > earlier but it resulted in breakage for some user space
> > > > applications[2].
> > > > Thus, previous behavior was restored where a user on RISC-V platforms
> > > > can directly read cycle or instruction count[3].
> > > >
> > > > Comparison with other ISAs w.r.t user space access of counters:
> > > > ARM64
> > > >   -- Enabled/Disabled via (/proc/sys/kernel/perf_user_access)
> > > >   -- Only for task bound events configured via perf.
> > > >
> > > > X86
> > > >  --- rdpmc instruction
> > > >  --- Enable/Disable via “/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc”
> > > > -- Before v4.0
> > > >  -- any process (even without active perf event) rdpmc
> > > > After v4.0
> > > > -- Default behavior changed to support only active events in a
> > > > process’s context.
> > > > -- Configured through perf similar to ARM64
> > > > -- Continue to maintain backward compatibility for unrestricted access
> > > > by writing 2 to “/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc”
> > > >
> > > > IMO, RISC-V should only enable user space access through perf similar
> > > > to ARM64 and x86 (post v4.0).
> > > > However, we do have to support the legacy behavior to avoid
> > > > application breakage.
> > > > As per my understanding a direct user space access can lead to the
> > > > following problems:
> > > >
> > > > 1) There is no context switch support, so counts from other contexts are exposed
> > > > 2) If a perf user is allocated one of these counters, the counter
> > > > value will be written
> > > >
> > > > Looking at the x86 code as it continues to allow the above behavior,
> > > > rdpmc_always_available_key is enabled in the above case. However,
> > > > during the context switch (cr4_update_pce_mm)
> > > > only dirty counters are cleared. It only prevents leakage from perf
> > > > task to rdpmc task.
> > > >
> > > > How does the context switch of counters work for users who enable
> > > > unrestricted access by writing 2 to “/sys/devices/cpu/rdpmc” ?
> > > > Otherwise, rdpmc users likely get noise from other applications. Is
> > > > that expected ?
> > >
> > > Regardless of leakage, they're also going to get random jumps in the visible
> > > values of the cycle count and instruction count as the task is context-switched
> > > (and/or if those values get reset across idle, as can happen on arm64), so
> > > those aren't going to be useful unless a number of other constraints apply.
> > >
> >
> > Agreed.
> >
> > > AFAICT the affected package was actually a library of intrinsics; does this
> > > affect a real application, or was this just in tests? If it's the latter there
> > > might still be scope to properly lock this down...
> > >
> >
> > Unfortunately, there are real applications In RISC-V started using
> > cycle counters due to legacy reasons.
> >
> > Here is the short list from debian repo pointed out in [1]
> > https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=%22rdcycle+%250%22
>
> The first of those is GRUB, when running bare metal.
>
> The second is this library again, which is not a whole application.
>
> I see that it's used in some benchmarks in real applications, e.g. firefox,
> chrome. However, as above we know that's *broken* today.
>
> Is that code actually run?
>
> > Looking at aarch64 code in one of the application, it seems they rely
> > on reading "pmccntr_el0" to read time
> > https://sources.debian.org/src/chromium/108.0.5359.124-1/third_party/ffmpeg/libavutil/aarch64/timer.h/
>
> That part is under ifdefs for mac os:
>
> | #if defined(__APPLE__)
>

Yes. Sorry I missed that earlier. I checked few other application code
which correctly
use cntvct_el0 as you pointed out.

> ... and it's nonsensical anyway, pmccntr_el0 is *not* a timer, and I don't know
> if Mac OS would bother to context-switch the value, so it's very likely broken
> anyhow.
>
> > AFAIK, any counter access from EL0 is disabled by default in
> > reset_pmuserenr_el0 and should be enabled via the
> > proc/sys/perf_user_access
> > in armv8pmu_enable_user_access. Is that correct ?
>
> Yes, we *only* enable access for tasks doing self-monitoring via perf.
>
> No other useage makes sense, since the value is arbitrarily reset, and it's not
> consistent across CPUs. It *cannot* be used as a timer.
>

Yes. That's what we were trying to convince the user space application
maintainers too.

> > I couldn't find any application actually enabling the access using
> > perf_user_access. Maybe I am missing something?
> > Otherwise, the above application would trap on access to pmccntr_el0.
>
> As above, that's on Mac OS, not Linux.
>

Yeah. My bad. Sorry for the noise :)

> Thanks,
> Mark.
>
> >
> > [1] https://groups.google.com/a/groups.riscv.org/g/sw-dev/c/REWcwYnzsKE?pli=1
> > > Thanks,
> > > Mark.
> > >
> > > > This can be a security concern also where a rogue rdpmc user
> > > > application can monitor other critical applications to initiate side
> > > > channel attack.
> > > >
> > > > Am I missing something? Please correct my understanding of the x86
> > > > implementation if it is wrong.
> > > >
> > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221201135110.3855965-1-conor.dooley@microchip.com/
> > > > [2] https://groups.google.com/a/groups.riscv.org/g/sw-dev/c/REWcwYnzsKE?pli=1
> > > > [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YxIzgYP3MujXdqwj@aurel32.net/T/
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Atish
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Atish



-- 
Regards,
Atish

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