Date:   Mon, 9 Jan 2023 14:33:13 +1100
From:   Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
        luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com,
        pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
        vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
        dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com,
        harald@...fian.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for
 SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event

On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> 
> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
> 
> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed through
> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
> both the report and certificate data at once.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |   2 +
>   2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>   		if (ret)
>   			goto e_free;
>   
> +		mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>   		ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false);
>   	} else {
>   		ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> @@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
>    */
>   static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>   {
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>   	struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
> -	void *context;
> +	void *context, *certs_data;
>   	int rc;
>   
> +	/* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest request */
> +	certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +	if (!certs_data)
> +		return NULL;
> +
>   	/* Allocate memory for context page */
>   	context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>   	if (!context)
> -		return NULL;
> +		goto e_free;
>   
>   	data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
>   	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);
> -	if (rc) {
> -		snp_free_firmware_page(context);
> -		return NULL;
> -	}
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto e_free;
> +
> +	sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>   
>   	return context;
> +
> +e_free:
> +	snp_free_firmware_page(context);
> +	kfree(certs_data);
> +	return NULL;
>   }
>   
>   static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
> @@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)
>   	snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
>   	sev->snp_context = NULL;
>   
> +	kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
> +
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> @@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
>   	case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>   	case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
>   	case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
> +	case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
> +	case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>   		break;
>   	default:
>   		reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
> @@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	return 1;
>   }
>   
> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> +					 struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
> +					 gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> +	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> +	kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> +
> +	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa, PAGE_SIZE))
> +		return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
> +
> +	req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
> +	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
> +		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +	resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
> +	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
> +		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +	if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
> +		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +	data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
> +	data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
> +{
> +	u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
> +	if (ret)
> +		*rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +	ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
> +	if (ret)
> +		*rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> +	struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
> +	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> +	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> +	unsigned long rc;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> +		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
> +		goto e_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +	rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);


This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...

> +	if (rc)
> +		/* use the firmware error code */
> +		rc = err;
> +
> +	snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
> +
> +unlock:
> +	mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +e_fail:
> +	svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> +	struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
> +	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> +	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> +	unsigned long data_npages;
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> +	unsigned long rc, err;
> +	u64 data_gpa;
> +
> +	if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> +		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
> +		goto e_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
> +	data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
> +
> +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
> +		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +		goto e_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +	rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned long)sev->snp_certs_data,
> +					 &data_npages, &err);

but this one does not and jump straight to drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c 
ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can these two be unified? 
sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks if fd is /dev/sev which is 
hardly useful.

"[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended 
attestation report" added this one.

Besides, is sev->fd really needed in the sev struct at all? Thanks,


> +	if (rc) {
> +		/*
> +		 * If buffer length is small then return the expected
> +		 * length in rbx.
> +		 */
> +		if (err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
> +			vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = data_npages;
> +
> +		/* pass the firmware error code */
> +		rc = err;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Copy the certificate blob in the guest memory */
> +	if (data_npages &&
> +	    kvm_write_guest(kvm, data_gpa, sev->snp_certs_data, data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT))
> +		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +cleanup:
> +	snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&req, &rc);
> +
> +unlock:
> +	mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +e_fail:
> +	svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
> +}
> +
>   static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>   {
>   	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
> @@ -3629,6 +3788,20 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   		vcpu->run->vmgexit.ghcb_msr = ghcb_gpa;
>   		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = snp_complete_psc;
>   		break;
> +	case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST: {
> +		snp_handle_guest_request(svm, control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
> +
> +		ret = 1;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +	case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST: {
> +		snp_handle_ext_guest_request(svm,
> +					     control->exit_info_1,
> +					     control->exit_info_2);
> +
> +		ret = 1;
> +		break;
> +	}
>   	case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>   		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
>   			    "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 12b9f4d539fb..7c0f9d00950f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>   	u64 snp_init_flags;
>   	void *snp_context;      /* SNP guest context page */
>   	spinlock_t psc_lock;
> +	void *snp_certs_data;
> +	struct mutex guest_req_lock;
>   };
>   
>   struct kvm_svm {

-- 
Alexey

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