linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <e7352525-02e5-1a41-7eb2-4d9e1151fa02@intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:21:28 -0800
From:   "Chen, Yian" <yian.chen@...el.com>
To:     Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@...el.com>, Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits



On 1/10/2023 12:14 PM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> On 1/9/2023 9:51 PM, Yian Chen wrote:
>> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a CPU feature to
>> prevent speculative address access in user/kernel mode.
>>
> 
> Would it be better to say?
> 
> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a security feature that 
> intends to prevent unintentional speculative address access across 
> user/kernel mode.
> 
>
Sure, I will revise the statement precisely.

>> LASS partitions 64-bit virtual address space into two
>> halves, lower address (LA[63]=0) and upper address
>> (LA[63]=1). It stops any data access or code execution
>>      1. from upper half address space to any lower half address
>>      2, from lower half address space to any upper half address
>> and generates #GP fault for a violation.
>>
> 
> I am not sure if this is the best way to say it. The kernel already 
> partitions the address space this way. LASS takes what is already the 
> typical OS implementation and bakes it into the hardware architecture.
> 
Yes, LASS by design matches the addressing usage in OS. I will try to 
include this in the statement.
>> In Linux, this means LASS does not allow both kernel code
>> to access any user space address and user code to access
>> any kernel space address.
>>
> 
> There is clearly an overlap between the protections provided by paging 
> and with SMAP and SMEP. It would be useful to paraphrase some of the 
> information mentioned in the spec regarding how LASS differs from them.
> 
Yes, I will differentiate between LASS and SMAP more clearly.

> "With these mode-based protections, paging can prevent malicious 
> software from directly reading or writing memory inappropriately. To 
> enforce these protections, the processor must traverse the hierarchy of 
> paging structures in memory. Unprivileged software can use timing 
> information resulting from this traversal to determine details about the 
> paging structures, and these details may be used to determine the layout 
> of supervisor memory.
> 
> Linear-address space separation (LASS) is an independent mechanism that 
> enforces the same mode-based protections as paging but without 
> traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by 
> LASS are applied before paging, “probes” by malicious software will 
> provide no paging-based timing information."
> 
Yes, I will also state the advantage of LASS.

>> Signed-off-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@...el.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
> 

Thanks,
Yian