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Message-Id: <dae48bf59df79657e2ec09cfa4a41bc05f1ce2a2.1673539719.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 18:02:34 +0100
From: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@...eya.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@...eya.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@...hat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom(,, GRND_TIMESTAMP) fast path
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Exports base_crng.generation to vDSO and adds getrandom() to the vDSO.
Based on Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> patch [1]
"[PATCH v14 6/7] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation",
but deal only with GRND_TIMESTAMP in vDSO: generating random stream
is left to the getrandom() syscall.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230101162910.710293-7-Jason@zx2c4.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1673539719.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com/
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@...eya.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++++
include/vdso/datapage.h | 9 ++++++++
lib/vdso/Kconfig | 5 ++++
lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 7f86d02cb427..20e1fabcb2e9 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -17521,6 +17521,7 @@ T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c
F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+F: lib/vdso/getrandom.c
RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
M: Matt Porter <mporter@...nel.crashing.org>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 9e2a37e432c0..a60f50c95ab1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
#include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
+#endif
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
@@ -271,6 +274,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)
if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
++next_gen;
WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+ smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen);
+#endif
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
crng_init = CRNG_READY;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
diff --git a/include/vdso/datapage.h b/include/vdso/datapage.h
index 73eb622e7663..7ae8e7ffe3ba 100644
--- a/include/vdso/datapage.h
+++ b/include/vdso/datapage.h
@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ struct vdso_data {
struct arch_vdso_data arch_data;
};
+/**
+ * struct vdso_rng_data - vdso RNG state information
+ * @generation: counter representing the number of RNG reseeds
+ */
+struct vdso_rng_data {
+ u64 generation;
+};
+
/*
* We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT
* relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +128,7 @@ struct vdso_data {
*/
extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
+extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
/*
* The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
diff --git a/lib/vdso/Kconfig b/lib/vdso/Kconfig
index d883ac299508..3b394fa83f65 100644
--- a/lib/vdso/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/vdso/Kconfig
@@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS
VDSO
endif
+
+config VDSO_GETRANDOM
+ bool
+ help
+ Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
diff --git a/lib/vdso/getrandom.c b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..827351a87002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/time64.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/getrandom.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/vsyscall.h>
+
+/**
+ * __cvdso_getrandom_data - Generic vDSO implementation of getrandom() syscall.
+ * @rng_info: Describes state of kernel RNG, memory shared with kernel.
+ * @buffer: Input/Output buffer.
+ * @len: Size of @buffer in bytes.
+ * @flags: Zero or more GRND_* flags.
+ */
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_t len,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ if (flags != GRND_TIMESTAMP)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ if (unlikely(!buffer))
+ goto fallback;
+
+ /* want aligned access */
+ if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)buffer, __alignof__(u64))))
+ goto fallback;
+
+ if (unlikely(len != sizeof(u64)))
+ goto fallback;
+
+ if (!get_random_timestamp_update((u64 *)buffer,
+ READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return sizeof(u64);
+
+fallback:
+ return getrandom_syscall(buffer, len, flags);
+}
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return __cvdso_getrandom_data(__arch_get_vdso_rng_data(), buffer, len, flags);
+}
--
2.37.2
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