linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] vfio: fix potential deadlock on vfio group lock

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 13 Jan 2023 10:49:06 -0400
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        cohuck@...hat.com, farman@...ux.ibm.com, pmorel@...ux.ibm.com,
        borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com, frankja@...ux.ibm.com,
        imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com, david@...hat.com, akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com,
        jjherne@...ux.ibm.com, pasic@...ux.ibm.com,
        zhenyuw@...ux.intel.com, zhi.a.wang@...el.com,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        intel-gvt-dev@...ts.freedesktop.org,
        intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfio: fix potential deadlock on vfio group lock

On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 02:05:14AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2023, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Thu, 12 Jan 2023 23:29:53 +0000
> > Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > On Thu, Jan 12, 2023, Matthew Rosato wrote:
> > > > On 1/12/23 4:05 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:  
> > > > > On Thu, 12 Jan 2023 15:38:44 -0500
> > > > > Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:  
> > > > >> @@ -344,6 +345,35 @@ static bool vfio_assert_device_open(struct vfio_device *device)
> > > > >>  	return !WARN_ON_ONCE(!READ_ONCE(device->open_count));
> > > > >>  }
> > > > >>  
> > > > >> +static bool vfio_kvm_get_kvm_safe(struct kvm *kvm)
> > > > >> +{
> > > > >> +	bool (*fn)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > > > >> +	bool ret;
> > > > >> +
> > > > >> +	fn = symbol_get(kvm_get_kvm_safe);
> > > > >> +	if (WARN_ON(!fn))  
> > > 
> > > In a related vein to Alex's comments about error handling, this should not WARN.
> > > WARNing during vfio_kvm_put_kvm() makes sense, but the "get" is somewhat blind.
> > 
> > It's not exactly blind though, we wouldn't have a kvm pointer if the
> > kvm-vfio device hadn't stuffed one into the group.  We only call into
> > here if we have a non-NULL pointer, so it wouldn't simply be that the
> > kvm module isn't available for this to fire, but more that we have an
> > API change to make the symbol no longer exist.  A WARN for that doesn't
> > seem unreasonable.  Thanks,
> 
> Hmm, I was thinking that it might be possible for kvm.ko to be on its way out,
> but barring use of force module unload, which breaks things left and right, kvm.ko
> can only be going if all VMs have been destroyed.

If we really care about these details then we should obtain both the
get_safe and put together, the put pointer should be stored in the
device and it should be symbol_put'd back once the kvm is put back and
it isn't needed any more.

This properly mimics how normal module stacking would work

Jason