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Message-ID: <95fdb0c8-b299-3174-f593-fc9b7f7d8b1c@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 16:48:08 -0600
From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To: Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com,
pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, dgilbert@...hat.com,
jarkko@...nel.org, harald@...fian.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 29/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command
when SNP is enabled
On 1/13/2023 4:42 PM, Alper Gun wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 2:04 PM Kalra, Ashish <ashish.kalra@....com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Alper,
>>
>> On 1/12/2023 2:47 PM, Alper Gun wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>
>>>> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware
>>>> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy
>>>> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the
>>>> firmware state before issuing the command..
>>>>
>>>> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware
>>>> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled:
>>>>
>>>> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory
>>>> 2) system physical address points to a host memory
>>>>
>>>> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP
>>>> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the
>>>> command completes.
>>>>
>>>> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
>>>> ---
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++
>>>> 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo
>>>> return rc;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
>>>> +{
>>>> + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */
>>>> + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> + int rc, n = 0, i;
>>>> +
>>>> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) {
>>>> + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + goto cleanup;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +cleanup:
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe
>>>> + * to release the page back to the system, leak it.
>>>> + */
>>>> + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n);
>>>> +
>>>> + return rc;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked)
>>>> {
>>>> unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr;
>>>> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id)
>>>> return sev_write_init_ex_file();
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct page *page;
>>>> + int i;
>>>> +
>>>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
>>>> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
>>>> +
>>>> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
>>>> +
>>>> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE));
>>>> + if (!page)
>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>> +
>>>> + map->host = page_address(page);
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int i;
>>>> +
>>>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
>>>> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
>>>> +
>>>> + if (map->host) {
>>>> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE));
>>>> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
>>>> + }
>>>> + }
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
>>>> +{
>>>> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> +
>>>> + map->active = false;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!paddr || !len)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + map->paddr = *paddr;
>>>> + map->len = len;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */
>>>> + if (guest) {
>>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + goto done;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!map->host)
>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */
>>>> + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */
>>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */
>>>> + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host);
>>>> +
>>>> +done:
>>>> + map->active = true;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
>>>> +{
>>>> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!map->active)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */
>>>> + if (guest) {
>>>> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + goto done;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps
>>>> + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must
>>>> + * be transitioned back to the shared state.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */
>>>> + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len));
>>>> + *paddr = map->paddr;
>>>> +
>>>> +done:
>>>> + map->active = false;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd)
>>>> +{
>>>> + switch (cmd) {
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
>>>> + return true;
>>>> + default:
>>>> + return false;
>>>> + }
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \
>>>> + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map)
>>>> +
>>>> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map);
>>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>>>> + bool from_fw = !to_fw;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to
>>>> + * hypervisor state.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so
>>>> + * no not need to reclaim the page.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
>>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>> If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and
>>> we will leak some pages in firmware state.
>>
>> Do you mean those (guest) pages which were transitioned to firmware
>> state as part of
>> snp_aware_copy_to_firmware()->_snp_cmd_buf_copy()->map_firmware_writeable()?
>
> yes, if we return here, these guest pages will be left in firmware state.
>>
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */
>>>> + if (fw_err)
>>>> + return 0;
> Same thing also here, we are possibly leaving guest pages in the firmware state.
>
Yes, i agree, both are inhererent bugs in the original patch and need to
be fixed.
Thanks,
Ashish
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + if (to_fw)
>>>> + func = map_firmware_writeable;
>>>> + else
>>>> + func = unmap_firmware_writeable;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address
>>>> + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise
>>>> + * change the page state in the RMP table.
>>>> + */
>>>> + switch (cmd) {
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address,
>>>> + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address,
>>>> + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len,
>>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len,
>>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len,
>>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false,
>>>> + &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true,
>>>> + &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address,
>>>> + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address,
>>>> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len,
>>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address,
>>>> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address,
>>>> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA:
>>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address,
>>>> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
>>>> + goto err;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + default:
>>>> + break;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */
>>>> + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
>>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>> This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First
>>> calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling
>>> rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf.
>>> In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has
>>> already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be
>>> reclaimed.
>>> This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware
>>> state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages
>>> will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, this looks to be an inherent issue with the original patch, as you
>> mentioned there are two pages - guest owned page and the HV cmd_buf, and
>> failure to transition the cmd_buf back to HV/shared state has no
>> corresponding recovery/reclaim for the transitioned guest page.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Ashish
>>
>>>>
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +err:
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */
>>>> + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
>>>> {
>>>> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
>>>> struct sev_device *sev;
>>>> unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
>>>> unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
>>>> + void *cmd_buf;
>>>> int buf_len;
>>>>
>>>> if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
>>>> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
>>>> * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be
>>>> * physically contiguous.
>>>> */
>>>> - if (data)
>>>> - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
>>>> + if (data) {
>>>> + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2)
>>>> + return -EBUSY;
>>>> +
>>>> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf;
>>>> +
>>>> + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
>>>> + sev->cmd_buf_active++;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the
>>>> + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> + } else {
>>>> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf;
>>>> + }
>>>>
>>>> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
>>>> - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
>>>> - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
>>>> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
>>>> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
>>>>
>>>> dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n",
>>>> cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout);
>>>> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
>>>> ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
>>>> - buf_len, false);
>>>> -
>>>> /*
>>>> * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on
>>>> * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error.
>>>> */
>>>> - if (data)
>>>> - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len);
>>>> + if (data) {
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Restore the page state after the command completes.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) &&
>>>> + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len);
>>>> + sev->cmd_buf_active--;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
>>>> + buf_len, false);
>>>>
>>>> return ret;
>>>> }
>>>> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
>>>> if (!sev)
>>>> goto e_err;
>>>>
>>>> - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
>>>> + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
>>>> if (!sev->cmd_buf)
>>>> goto e_sev;
>>>>
>>>> + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE;
>>>> +
>>>> psp->sev_data = sev;
>>>>
>>>> sev->dev = dev;
>>>> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev)
>>>> snp_range_list = NULL;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the
>>>> + * SNP firmware shutdown.
>>>> + */
>>>> + free_snp_host_map(sev);
>>>> +
>>>> sev_snp_shutdown(&error);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
>>>> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
>>>> }
>>>> }
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) {
>>>> + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n");
>>>> + goto skip_legacy;
>>>> + }
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */
>>>> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
>>>> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n",
>>>> error, rc);
>>>>
>>>> +skip_legacy:
>>>> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ?
>>>> "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build);
>>>>
>>>> return;
>>>>
>>>> err:
>>>> + free_snp_host_map(sev);
>>>> psp_master->sev_data = NULL;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@
>>>> #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16
>>>> #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0)
>>>>
>>>> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2
>>>> +
>>>> struct sev_misc_dev {
>>>> struct kref refcount;
>>>> struct miscdevice misc;
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> +struct snp_host_map {
>>>> + u64 paddr;
>>>> + u32 len;
>>>> + void *host;
>>>> + bool active;
>>>> +};
>>>> +
>>>> struct sev_device {
>>>> struct device *dev;
>>>> struct psp_device *psp;
>>>> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device {
>>>> u8 build;
>>>>
>>>> void *cmd_buf;
>>>> + void *cmd_buf_backup;
>>>> + int cmd_buf_active;
>>>>
>>>> bool snp_initialized;
>>>> + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS];
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);
>>>> --
>>>> 2.25.1
>>>>
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