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Message-ID: <Y8HldeHBrw+OOZVm@google.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 23:12:53 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@....com>,
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@...wei.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>, tabba@...gle.com,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com,
wei.w.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 7/9] KVM: Update lpage info when private/shared
memory are mixed
On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 283cbb83d6ae..7772ab37ac89 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
>
> #define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_VCPU_DEBUGFS
> +#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
No need for this, I think we should just make it mandatory to implement the
arch hook when CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES=y. If another arch gains
support for mem attributes and doesn't need the hook, then we can simply add a
weak helper (or maybe add a #define then if we feel that's the way to go).
> #define KVM_MAX_VCPUS 1024
>
> @@ -1011,6 +1012,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
> #endif
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Use a bit in disallow_lpage to indicate private/shared pages mixed at the
> + * level. The remaining bits are used as a reference count.
> + */
> +#define KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED (1U << 31)
Similar to the need to unmap, I think we should just say "mixed" and ignore the
private vs. shared, i.e. make this a flag for all memory attributes.
> +#define KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX ((1U << 31) - 1)
"MAX" is technically correct, but it's more of a mask. I think we can make it a
moot point though. There's no need to mask the count, we just want to assert that
adjusting the counting doesn't change the flag.
I would also say throw these defines into mmu.c, at least pending the bug fix
for kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata() (more on that below).
> struct kvm_lpage_info {
> int disallow_lpage;
> };
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index e2c70b5afa3e..2190fd8c95c0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -763,11 +763,16 @@ static void update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> {
> struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
> int i;
> + int disallow_count;
>
> for (i = PG_LEVEL_2M; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
> linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, i);
> +
> + disallow_count = linfo->disallow_lpage & KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX;
> + WARN_ON(disallow_count + count < 0 ||
> + disallow_count > KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX - count);
> +
> linfo->disallow_lpage += count;
> - WARN_ON(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0);
It's been a long week so don't trust my math, but I believe this can simply be:
old = linfo->disallow_lpage;
linfo->disallow_lpage += count;
WARN_ON_ONCE((old ^ linfo->disallow_lpage) & KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -6986,3 +6991,130 @@ void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> if (kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread)
> kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
> }
> +
> +static bool linfo_is_mixed(struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo)
> +{
> + return linfo->disallow_lpage & KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED;
> +}
> +
> +static void linfo_set_mixed(gfn_t gfn, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> + int level, bool mixed)
> +{
> + struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level);
> +
> + if (mixed)
> + linfo->disallow_lpage |= KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED;
> + else
> + linfo->disallow_lpage &= ~KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED;
> +}
> +
> +static bool is_expected_attr_entry(void *entry, unsigned long expected_attrs)
> +{
> + bool expect_private = expected_attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE;
> +
> + if (xa_to_value(entry) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE) {
> + if (!expect_private)
> + return false;
> + } else if (expect_private)
> + return false;
This is messy. If we drop the private vs. shared specifity, this can go away if
we add a helper to get attributes
static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
return xa_to_value(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn));
}
and then we can do
if (KVM_BUG_ON(gfn != xas.xa_index, kvm) ||
attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn)) {
mixed = true;
break;
}
and
if (linfo_is_mixed(lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level - 1)) ||
attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn))
return true;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool mem_attrs_mixed_2m(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + XA_STATE(xas, &kvm->mem_attr_array, start);
> + gfn_t gfn = start;
> + void *entry;
> + bool mixed = false;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + entry = xas_load(&xas);
> + while (gfn < end) {
> + if (xas_retry(&xas, entry))
> + continue;
> +
> + KVM_BUG_ON(gfn != xas.xa_index, kvm);
As above, I think it's worth bailing immediately if there's a mismatch.
> +
> + if (!is_expected_attr_entry(entry, attrs)) {
> + mixed = true;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + entry = xas_next(&xas);
> + gfn++;
> + }
> +
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return mixed;
> +}
> +
> +static bool mem_attrs_mixed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
s/mem_attrs_mixed/has_mixed_attrs to make it clear this is querying, not setting.
And has_mixed_attrs_2m() above.
> + int level, unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + unsigned long gfn;
> +
> + if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M)
> + return mem_attrs_mixed_2m(kvm, attrs, start, end);
> +
> + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn += KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1))
Curly braces needed on the for-loop.
> + if (linfo_is_mixed(lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level - 1)) ||
> + !is_expected_attr_entry(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn),
> + attrs))
> + return true;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void kvm_update_lpage_private_shared_mixed(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> + unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + unsigned long pages, mask;
> + gfn_t gfn, gfn_end, first, last;
> + int level;
> + bool mixed;
> +
> + /*
> + * The sequence matters here: we set the higher level basing on the
> + * lower level's scanning result.
> + */
> + for (level = PG_LEVEL_2M; level <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; level++) {
> + pages = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
> + mask = ~(pages - 1);
> + first = start & mask;
> + last = (end - 1) & mask;
> +
> + /*
> + * We only need to scan the head and tail page, for middle pages
> + * we know they will not be mixed.
> + */
> + gfn = max(first, slot->base_gfn);
> + gfn_end = min(first + pages, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
> + mixed = mem_attrs_mixed(kvm, slot, level, attrs, gfn, gfn_end);
> + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, mixed);
> +
> + if (first == last)
> + return;
> +
> + for (gfn = first + pages; gfn < last; gfn += pages)
> + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, false);
> +
> + gfn = last;
> + gfn_end = min(last + pages, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
> + mixed = mem_attrs_mixed(kvm, slot, level, attrs, gfn, gfn_end);
> + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, mixed);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> + unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot))
Make this an early return optimization, with a comment explaining that KVM x86
doesn't yet support other attributes.
/*
* KVM x86 currently only supports KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, skip
* the slot if the slot will never consume the PRIVATE attribute.
*/
if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot))
return;
> + kvm_update_lpage_private_shared_mixed(kvm, slot, attrs,
> + start, end);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 9a07380f8d3c..5aefcff614d2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12362,6 +12362,8 @@ static int kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata(struct kvm *kvm,
> if ((slot->base_gfn + npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
> linfo[lpages - 1].disallow_lpage = 1;
> ugfn = slot->userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot))
> + ugfn |= slot->restricted_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
I would rather reject memslot if the gfn has lesser alignment than the offset.
I'm totally ok with this approach _if_ there's a use case. Until such a use case
presents itself, I would rather be conservative from a uAPI perspective.
> /*
> * If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
> * other, disable large page support for this slot.
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 3331c0c92838..25099c94e770 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -592,6 +592,11 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {
> struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier;
> };
>
> +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> +{
> + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE);
KVM_MEM_PRIVATE should really be defined only when private memory is exposed to
userspace. For this patch, even though it means we have untestable code, I think
it makes sense to "return false".
> +}
> +
> static inline bool kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> {
> return slot->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
> @@ -2316,4 +2321,18 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr)
> /* Max number of entries allowed for each kvm dirty ring */
> #define KVM_DIRTY_RING_MAX_ENTRIES 65536
>
> +#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> +void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> + unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> +#else
> +static inline void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> + unsigned long attrs,
> + gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif /* __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
As above, no stub is necessary.
> #endif
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index 4e1e1e113bf0..e107afea32f0 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -2354,7 +2354,8 @@ static u64 kvm_supported_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
Feedback for an earlier patch (to avoid churn): this should be kvm_mem_attrs_changed()
or so now that this does more than just unmap.
> +static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
> + unsigned long attrs)
Weird nit. I think we should keep the prototypes for kvm_mem_attrs_changed()
and kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes() somewhat similar, i.e. squeeze in @attrs
before @start.
> {
> struct kvm_gfn_range gfn_range;
> struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> @@ -2378,6 +2379,10 @@ static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> gfn_range.slot = slot;
>
> r |= kvm_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &gfn_range);
> +
> + kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(kvm, slot, attrs,
> + gfn_range.start,
> + gfn_range.end);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -2427,7 +2432,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> KVM_MMU_LOCK(kvm);
> if (i > start)
> - kvm_unmap_mem_range(kvm, start, i);
> + kvm_unmap_mem_range(kvm, start, i, attrs->attributes);
> kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm);
> KVM_MMU_UNLOCK(kvm);
> srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
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