| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 13:53:26 +0200
From: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>,
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <bp@...en8.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
<tglx@...utronix.de>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<thomas.lendacky@....com>, <michael.roth@....com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, <stable@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation
support
On Thu, 12 Jan 2023 14:11:39 +0530
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com> wrote:
> The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63])
> and start the SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side
> implementation. If any of these features are enabled without guest
> side implementation, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined.
> The SNP guest boot may fail in a non-obvious way making it difficult
> to debug.
>
> Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly
> later, detect this early and fail gracefully.
>
> SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.
> While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled
> features have guest side implementation. In case any feature is not
> implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB
> protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event[1]. Populate
> SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor
> can easily report to the user.
>
> More details in AMD64 APM[2] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
>
> [1] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
> 4.1.13 Termination Request
>
> [2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
>
The link of [2] is broken. Better update it.
> Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
> CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
> CC: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
> CC: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> CC: <stable@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
>
> ---
>
> Changes:
> v4:
> * Update comments and indentation
> * Reuse GHCB MSR Protocol reason set
> * Invalidate ghcb page before using
> * GHCB protocol NAE termination event is available after version 2,
> verify ghcb version before using the termination event.
>
> v3:
> * Use GHCB protocol NAE termination event SEV-SNP feature(s)
> not supported along with SW_EXITINFO2 containing mask of the
> unsupported features. Need handling of this event on the HV.
> * Add the SNP features check initialize_identity_maps() when the
> boot GHCB page can be initialized and used.
> * Fixed sphinx warnings in documentation
>
> v2:
> * Updated Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> * Address review feedback from Boris/Tom
>
> v1:
> * Dropped _ENABLED from the feature bits
> * Use approprate macro/function names and move closer to the function
> where it is used.
> * More details added to the commit message and comments
> * Fixed compilation issue
> ---
> Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 36 ++++++++++++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 9 +++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 20 +++++++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 6 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 5 ++
> 7 files changed, 139 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst index
> a1940ebe7be5..b3adc39d7735 100644 ---
> a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++
> b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by
> supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS
> does not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory
> encryption, even if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on
> command line parameter is specified. +
> +Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
> +==========================
> +
> +SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be
> enabled +by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these
> features need +guest side implementation to function correctly. The
> below table lists the +expected guest behavior with various possible
> scenarios of guest/hypervisor +SNP feature support.
> +
"guest needs implementation" seems a little bit confusing. I suppose it
means the feature is mandatory for the guest. If so, on the second row
guest can boot without it. Some explanation?
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Feature Enabled | Guest needs | Guest has | Guest boot |
> +| by the HV | implementation| implementation| behaviour |
> ++=================+===============+===============+==================+
> +| No | No | No | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| No | Yes | No | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| No | Yes | Yes | Boot |
> +| | | | |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | No | No | Boot with |
> +| | | | feature enabled |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | Yes | No | Graceful boot |
> +| | | | failure |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Yes | Yes | Yes | Boot with |
> +| | | | feature enabled |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +
> +More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
> +
> +[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332_4.05.pdf
Probably update the link here as well.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index a75712991df3..551d583fac9c
> 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -557,6 +557,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
> /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
> movq (%rsp), %rdi
> call initialize_identity_maps
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + /*
> + * Now that the required page table mappings are established
> and a
> + * GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature
> compatibility.
> + */
> + call snp_check_features
> +#endif
> +
> popq %rsi
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h index 62208ec04ca4..593415e22614 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
> +void snp_check_features(void);
> void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
> extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
> void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index c93930d5ccbd..40c5f8bc733d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -270,6 +270,68 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
> sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX,
> GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0); }
>
> +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
> + * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
> + * of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
> + * side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
> + * guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
> + *
> + * As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
> + * safe side add them to the required features mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ (MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION
> | \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 |
> \
> + MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
> + > +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
> + * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
> + * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
> +
> +void snp_check_features(void)
> +{
> + u64 unsupported_features;
> +
> + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature
> + * lacking guest side implementation.
> + */
> + unsupported_features = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ &
> ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
> + if (unsupported_features) {
> + if (sev_es_get_ghcb_version() < 2 ||
> + (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb()))
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN,
> GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); +
===
> + u64 exit_info_1 =
> SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); +
> + vc_ghcb_invalidate(boot_ghcb);
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(boot_ghcb,
> SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(boot_ghcb, exit_info_1);
> + ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(boot_ghcb,
> unsupported_features); +
> + sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(boot_ghcb));
> + VMGEXIT();
> +
> + while (true)
> + asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
===
This seems another approach to terminate the guest which can bring extra
reason info compared to sev_es_terminate(). It would be better to wrap
the above snippet into a function and call it here.
> + }
> +}
> +
> void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
> {
> unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 37ff47552bcb..d3fe82c5d6b6
> 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED
> BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT) #define
> MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
> +/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC BIT_ULL(4)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ BIT_ULL(5)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ BIT_ULL(6)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(7)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS BIT_ULL(8)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION BIT_ULL(9)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS BIT_ULL(10)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(11)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM BIT_ULL(12)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT BIT_ULL(14)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(16)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(17)
> +
> +/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 BIT_ULL(13)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 BIT_ULL(15)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
> +
> #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
>
> /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h index f69c168391aa..a04fe07eb9a8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> @@ -116,6 +116,12 @@
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
> + /* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */ \
> + (((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) | \
^
One extra space before 0xf should be removed.
> + /* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */ \
> + ((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
>
> /* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> index 3a5b0c9c4fcc..38ec3386984a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> @@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
> return true;
> }
>
> +static u16 sev_es_get_ghcb_version(void)
> +{
> + return ghcb_version;
> +}
> +
> static __always_inline void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
> {
> ghcb->save.sw_exit_code = 0;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists