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Message-ID: <460524f8-e52b-e195-3bd2-27e41f367f5d@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 13:26:02 +0530
From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 07/64] KVM: SEV: Handle KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
hypercall
On 13/01/23 21:47, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 13, 2023, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 01:39:59PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
>>> From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
>>>
>>> KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a
>>> change in the page encryption status to the hypervisor.
>>>
>>> The hypercall exits to userspace with KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL exit code,
>>> currently this is used for explicit memory conversion between
>>> shared/private for memfd based private memory.
>>
>> So Tom and I spent a while to figure out what this is doing...
>>
>> Please explain in more detail what that is. Like the hypercall gets ignored for
>> memslots which cannot be private...?
This was required when we were using per memslot bitmap for storing the
private information, mem_attr_array is not dependent on memslot anymore.
>
> Don't bother, just drop the patch.
Agree, we can drop this. I have tested SEV without this patch.
> It's perfectly legal for userspace to create the private memslot in response > to a guest request.
Sean, did not understand this part, how could a memslot be created on a guest request?
Regards
Nikunj
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