linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fork, vmalloc: KASAN-poison backing pages of vmapped stacks

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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+aQUeoWnWmbDG3O2_P75f=2u=VDRA1PjuTtbJsp5Xw2VA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Jan 2023 08:36:09 +0100
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fork, vmalloc: KASAN-poison backing pages of vmapped stacks

On Tue, 17 Jan 2023 at 17:35, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> KASAN (except in HW_TAGS mode) tracks memory state based on virtual
> addresses. The mappings of kernel stack pages in the linear mapping are
> currently marked as fully accessible.

Hi Jann,

To confirm my understanding, this is not just KASAN (except in HW_TAGS
mode), but also CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is required, right?

> Since stack corruption issues can cause some very gnarly errors, let's be
> extra careful and tell KASAN to forbid accesses to stack memory through the
> linear mapping.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> ---
> I wrote this after seeing
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y8W5rjKdZ9erIF14@casper.infradead.org/
> and wondering about possible ways that this kind of stack corruption
> could be sneaking past KASAN.
> That's proooobably not the explanation, but still...

I think catching any silent corruptions is still very useful. Besides
confusing reports, sometimes they lead to an explosion of random
reports all over the kernel.

>  include/linux/vmalloc.h |  6 ++++++
>  kernel/fork.c           | 10 ++++++++++
>  mm/vmalloc.c            | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> index 096d48aa3437..bfb50178e5e3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> @@ -297,4 +297,10 @@ bool vmalloc_dump_obj(void *object);
>  static inline bool vmalloc_dump_obj(void *object) { return false; }
>  #endif
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
> +void vmalloc_poison_backing_pages(const void *addr);
> +#else
> +static inline void vmalloc_poison_backing_pages(const void *addr) {}
> +#endif

I think this should be in kasan headers and prefixed with kasan_.
There are also kmsan/kcsan that may poison memory and hw poisoning
(MADV_HWPOISON), so it's a somewhat overloaded term on its own.

Can/should this be extended to all vmalloc-ed memory? Or some of it
can be accessed via both addresses?

Also, should we mprotect it instead while it's allocated as the stack?
If it works, it looks like a reasonable improvement for
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK in general. Would also catch non-instrumented
accesses.

>  #endif /* _LINUX_VMALLOC_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 9f7fe3541897..5c8c103a3597 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -321,6 +321,16 @@ static int alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
>                 vfree(stack);
>                 return -ENOMEM;
>         }
> +
> +       /*
> +        * A virtually-allocated stack's memory should only be accessed through
> +        * the vmalloc area, not through the linear mapping.
> +        * Inform KASAN that all accesses through the linear mapping should be
> +        * reported (instead of permitting all accesses through the linear
> +        * mapping).
> +        */
> +       vmalloc_poison_backing_pages(stack);
> +
>         /*
>          * We can't call find_vm_area() in interrupt context, and
>          * free_thread_stack() can be called in interrupt context,
> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> index ca71de7c9d77..10c79c53cf5c 100644
> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -4042,6 +4042,30 @@ void pcpu_free_vm_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms)
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
> +/*
> + * Poison the KASAN shadow for the linear mapping of the pages used as stack
> + * memory.
> + * NOTE: This makes no sense in HW_TAGS mode because HW_TAGS marks physical
> + * memory, not virtual memory.
> + */
> +void vmalloc_poison_backing_pages(const void *addr)
> +{
> +       struct vm_struct *area;
> +       int i;
> +
> +       if (WARN(!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr), "bad address (%p)\n", addr))
> +               return;
> +
> +       area = find_vm_area(addr);
> +       if (WARN(!area, "nonexistent vm area (%p)\n", addr))
> +               return;
> +
> +       for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++)
> +               kasan_poison_pages(area->pages[i], 0, false);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
>  bool vmalloc_dump_obj(void *object)
>  {
>
> base-commit: 5dc4c995db9eb45f6373a956eb1f69460e69e6d4
> --
> 2.39.0.314.g84b9a713c41-goog
>