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Message-ID: <202301191640.DE1E4D3@keescook>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 16:40:40 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
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Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com, christina.schimpe@...el.com,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 01:22:40PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>
> Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
> address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
> kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
> for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
> is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
> without protection.
>
> Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
> share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
> that at least one CET feature is configured.
>
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
--
Kees Cook
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