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Message-Id: <20230120102512.3195094-1-gscrivan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 11:25:11 +0100
From: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@...omium.org, bristot@...hat.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
brauner@...nel.org, cyphar@...har.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
alexl@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, bmasney@...hat.com,
gscrivan@...hat.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
This patch adds a new prctl called PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE which allows
processes to hide their own /proc/*/exe file. When this prctl is
used, every access to /proc/*/exe for the calling process will
fail with ENOENT.
This is useful for preventing issues like CVE-2019-5736, where an
attacker can gain host root access by overwriting the binary
in OCI runtimes through file-descriptor mishandling in containers.
The current fix for CVE-2019-5736 is to create a read-only copy or
a bind-mount of the current executable, and then re-exec the current
process. With the new prctl, the read-only copy or bind-mount copy is
not needed anymore.
While map_files/ also might contain symlinks to files in host,
proc_map_files_get_link() permissions checks are already sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@...hat.com>
---
v2: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/1/19/849
Differences from v2:
- fixed the test to check PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE after fork
v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/1/4/334
Differences from v1:
- amended more information in the commit message wrt map_files not
requiring the same protection.
- changed the test to verify PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE cannot be unset after
a fork.
fs/exec.c | 1 +
fs/proc/base.c | 8 +++++---
include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
kernel/sys.c | 9 +++++++++
tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ab913243a367..5a5dd964c3a3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
+ task_clear_hide_self_exe(current);
rseq_execve(current);
acct_update_integrals(current);
task_numa_free(current, false);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 9e479d7d202b..959968e2da0d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1723,19 +1723,21 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct file *exe_file;
+ long hide_self_exe;
task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task);
+ hide_self_exe = task_hide_self_exe(task);
put_task_struct(task);
- if (exe_file) {
+ if (exe_file && !hide_self_exe) {
*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
fput(exe_file);
return 0;
- } else
- return -ENOENT;
+ }
+ return -ENOENT;
}
static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 853d08f7562b..8db32d5fc285 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1790,6 +1790,7 @@ static __always_inline bool is_percpu_thread(void)
#define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted */
#define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE 6 /* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */
#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC 7 /* Speculative Store Bypass clear on execve() */
+#define PFA_HIDE_SELF_EXE 8 /* Hide /proc/self/exe for the process */
#define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \
static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \
@@ -1832,6 +1833,10 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_TEST(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+TASK_PFA_SET(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+
static inline void
current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
{
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a5e06dcbba13..f12f3df12468 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -284,4 +284,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41
# define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0
+#define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
+#define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 5fd54bf0e886..e992f1b72973 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2626,6 +2626,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case PR_SET_VMA:
error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
break;
+ case PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE:
+ if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ task_set_hide_self_exe(current);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE:
+ if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return task_hide_self_exe(current) ? 1 : 0;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a5e06dcbba13..f12f3df12468 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -284,4 +284,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41
# define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0
+#define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
+#define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
--
2.38.1
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