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Date:   Tue, 24 Jan 2023 17:24:02 +0100
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "bsingharora@...il.com" <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Syromiatnikov, Eugene" <esyr@...hat.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "rdunlap@...radead.org" <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Eranian, Stephane" <eranian@...gle.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "fweimer@...hat.com" <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "nadav.amit@...il.com" <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        "jannh@...gle.com" <jannh@...gle.com>,
        "dethoma@...rosoft.com" <dethoma@...rosoft.com>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kcc@...gle.com" <kcc@...gle.com>, "pavel@....cz" <pavel@....cz>,
        "oleg@...hat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>,
        "hjl.tools@...il.com" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Schimpe, Christina" <christina.schimpe@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "mike.kravetz@...cle.com" <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        "jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com" <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        "john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>,
        "rppt@...nel.org" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "andrew.cooper3@...rix.com" <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        "gorcunov@...il.com" <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        "akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 18/39] mm: Handle faultless write upgrades for shstk

On 23.01.23 21:47, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-01-23 at 10:50 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 19.01.23 22:22, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
>>> The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes
>>> a new
>>> type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has
>>> some
>>> unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
>>> properly.
>>>
>>> Since shadow stack memory can be changed from userspace, is both
>>> VM_SHADOW_STACK and VM_WRITE. But it should not be made
>>> conventionally
>>> writable (i.e. pte_mkwrite()). So some code that calls
>>> pte_mkwrite() needs
>>> to be adjusted.
>>>
>>> One such case is when memory is made writable without an actual
>>> write
>>> fault. This happens in some mprotect operations, and also prot_numa
>>> faults.
>>> In both cases code checks whether it should be made
>>> (conventionally)
>>> writable by calling vma_wants_manual_pte_write_upgrade().
>>>
>>> One way to fix this would be have code actually check if memory is
>>> also
>>> VM_SHADOW_STACK and in that case call pte_mkwrite_shstk(). But
>>> since
>>> most memory won't be shadow stack, just have simpler logic and skip
>>> this
>>> optimization by changing vma_wants_manual_pte_write_upgrade() to
>>> not
>>> return true for VM_SHADOW_STACK_MEMORY. This will simply handle all
>>> cases of this type.
>>>
>>> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
>>> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
>>> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
>>> ---
>>
>> Instead of having these x86-shadow stack details all over the MM
>> space,
>> was the option explored to handle this more in arch specific code?
>>
>> IIUC, one way to get it working would be
>>
>> 1) Have a SW "shadowstack" PTE flag.
>> 2) Have an "SW-dirty" PTE flag, to store "dirty=1" when "write=0".
> 
> I don't think that idea came up. So vma->vm_page_prot would have the SW
> shadow stack flag for VM_SHADOW_STACK, and pte_mkwrite() could do
> Write=0,Dirty=1 part. It seems like it should work.
> 

Right, if we include it in vma->vm_page_prot, we'd immediately let 
mk_pte() just handle that.

Otherwise, we'd have to refactor e.g., mk_pte() to consume a vma instead 
of the vma->vm_page_prot. Let's see if we can avoid that for now.

>>
>> pte_mkwrite(), pte_write(), pte_dirty ... can then make decisions
>> based
>> on the "shadowstack" PTE flag and hide all these details from core-
>> mm.
>>
>> When mapping a shadowstack page (new page, migration, swapin, ...),
>> which can be obtained by looking at the VMA flags, the first thing
>> you'd
>> do is set the "shadowstack" PTE flag.
> 
> I guess the downside is that it uses an extra software bit. But the
> other positive is that it's less error prone, so that someone writing
> core-mm code won't introduce a change that makes shadow stack VMAs
> Write=1 if they don't know to also check for VM_SHADOW_STACK.

Right. And I think this mimics the what I would have expected HW to 
provide: a dedicated HW bit, not somehow mangling this into semantics of 
existing bits.

Roughly speaking: if we abstract it that way and get all of the "how to 
set it writable now?" out of core-MM, it not only is cleaner and less 
error prone, it might even allow other architectures that implement 
something comparable (e.g., using a dedicated HW bit) to actually reuse 
some of that work. Otherwise most of that "shstk" is really just x86 
specific ...

I guess the only cases we have to special case would be page pinning 
code where pte_write() would indicate that the PTE is writable (well, it 
is, just not by "ordinary CPU instruction" context directly): but you do 
that already, so ... :)

Sorry for stumbling over that this late, I only started looking into 
this when you CCed me on that one patch.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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