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Message-Id: <20230124134131.637036-34-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 08:41:30 -0500
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@...gle.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
brho@...gle.com, catalin.marinas@....com, broonie@...nel.org,
legion@...nel.org, Jason@...c4.com, surenb@...gle.com
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 34/35] prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11 ]
do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced. In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@...gle.com>
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@...gle.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
kernel/sys.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 5fd54bf0e886..88b31f096fb2 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1442,6 +1442,8 @@ static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
+ resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
+
if (new_rlim) {
if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.39.0
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