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Message-Id: <18bb5a8c0c81211cba5b865b4fbb5c2dd6b9e688.1674660533.git.legion@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:28:52 +0100
From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Val Cowan <vcowan@...hat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 5/6] proc: Validate incoming allowlist
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>
---
fs/proc/internal.h | 10 +++
fs/proc/proc_allowlist.c | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
fs/proc/root.c | 22 +-----
include/linux/proc_fs.h | 7 +-
4 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 3e1b1f29b13d..2ca4e53a4b4b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -334,8 +334,18 @@ static inline void pde_force_lookup(struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
* proc_allowlist.c
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_ALLOW_LIST
+extern int proc_allowlist_append(struct list_head *, const char *, size_t);
+extern void proc_allowlist_free(struct list_head *);
extern bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *, struct proc_dir_entry *);
#else
+static inline int proc_allowlist_append(struct list_head *, const char *, size_t)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void proc_allowlist_free(struct list_head *)
+{
+ return;
+}
static inline bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
{
return true;
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_allowlist.c b/fs/proc/proc_allowlist.c
index c605f73622bd..0115015c74f0 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_allowlist.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_allowlist.c
@@ -11,16 +11,56 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/rwlock.h>
+#include <linux/list_sort.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define FILE_SEQFILE(f) ((struct seq_file *)((f)->private_data))
#define FILE_DATA(f) (FILE_SEQFILE(f)->private)
+int proc_allowlist_append(struct list_head *allowlist, const char *path, size_t len)
+{
+ struct allowlist_entry *new;
+
+ if (!len)
+ return 0;
+
+ new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!new)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ new->path = kstrndup(path, len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!new->path)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
+ list_add_tail(&new->list, allowlist);
+
+ return 0;
+nomem:
+ if (new) {
+ kfree(new->path);
+ kfree(new);
+ }
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void proc_allowlist_free(struct list_head *allowlist)
+{
+ struct list_head *el, *next;
+ struct allowlist_entry *entry;
+
+ list_for_each_safe(el, next, allowlist) {
+ entry = list_entry(el, struct allowlist_entry, list);
+ kfree(entry->path);
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
+}
+
bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
bool ret = false;
- char *ptr;
unsigned long flags;
+ struct list_head *el, *next;
if (!(fs_info->subset & PROC_SUBSET_ALLOWLIST)) {
if (!pde_is_allowlist(de))
@@ -31,24 +71,13 @@ bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct proc_dir_entry
read_lock_irqsave(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
- ptr = fs_info->allowlist;
-
- while (ptr && *ptr != '\0') {
- struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
- char *sep, *end;
- size_t len, pathlen;
+ list_for_each_safe(el, next, &fs_info->allowlist) {
+ struct allowlist_entry *entry = list_entry(el, struct allowlist_entry, list);
- if (!(sep = strchr(ptr, '\n')))
- pathlen = strlen(ptr);
- else
- pathlen = (sep - ptr);
-
- if (!pathlen)
- goto next;
-
- pde = de;
- end = NULL;
- len = pathlen;
+ struct proc_dir_entry *pde = de;
+ char *end = NULL;
+ char *ptr = entry->path;
+ size_t len = strlen(entry->path);
while (ptr != end && len > 0) {
end = ptr + len - 1;
@@ -72,8 +101,7 @@ bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct proc_dir_entry
ret = true;
break;
-next:
- ptr += pathlen + 1;
+next: ;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
@@ -84,12 +112,18 @@ bool proc_pde_access_allowed(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct proc_dir_entry
static int show_allowlist(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(m->file->f_inode->i_sb);
- char *p = fs_info->allowlist;
unsigned long flags;
+ struct list_head *el, *next;
+ struct allowlist_entry *entry;
read_lock_irqsave(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
- if (p)
- seq_puts(m, p);
+
+ list_for_each_safe(el, next, &fs_info->allowlist) {
+ entry = list_entry(el, struct allowlist_entry, list);
+ seq_puts(m, entry->path);
+ seq_puts(m, "\n");
+ }
+
read_unlock_irqrestore(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
return 0;
@@ -155,34 +189,93 @@ static ssize_t write_allowlist(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, siz
return count;
}
+static int allowlist_cmp(void *priv, const struct list_head *a, const struct list_head *b)
+{
+ struct allowlist_entry *ia = list_entry(a, struct allowlist_entry, list);
+ struct allowlist_entry *ib = list_entry(b, struct allowlist_entry, list);
+
+ return strcmp(ia->path, ib->path);
+}
+
+static int recreate_allowlist(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, const char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ const char *ptr = buf;
+ size_t len = buflen;
+ size_t lineno = 1;
+ int ret = 0;
+ LIST_HEAD(allowlist);
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ char *sep;
+ size_t pathlen;
+
+ if (!(sep = memchr(ptr, '\n', len)))
+ pathlen = buflen;
+ else
+ pathlen = (sep - ptr);
+
+ if (pathlen > 0) {
+ ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (pathlen >= PATH_MAX) {
+ pr_crit("allowlist:%lu: pathname is too long\n", lineno);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ptr == '/') {
+ pr_crit("allowlist:%lu: the name must be relative to the mount point\n", lineno);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!isalpha(*ptr)) {
+ pr_crit("allowlist:%lu: name must start with a letter\n", lineno);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ proc_allowlist_append(&allowlist, ptr, pathlen);
+ }
+
+ ptr += pathlen + 1;
+ len -= pathlen + 1;
+
+ lineno++;
+ }
+
+ proc_allowlist_free(&fs_info->allowlist);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fs_info->allowlist);
+
+ if (!list_empty(&allowlist)) {
+ list_replace(&allowlist, &fs_info->allowlist);
+ list_sort(NULL, &fs_info->allowlist, allowlist_cmp);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ proc_allowlist_free(&allowlist);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int close_allowlist(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq_file = FILE_SEQFILE(file);
struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
if (seq_file->buf && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+ unsigned long flags;
char *buf;
if (!seq_get_buf(seq_file, &buf))
return -EIO;
*buf = '\0';
- if (strcmp(seq_file->buf, fs_info->allowlist)) {
- unsigned long flags;
-
- buf = kstrndup(seq_file->buf, seq_file->count, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!buf)
- return -EIO;
-
- write_lock_irqsave(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
-
- shrink_dcache_sb(inode->i_sb);
-
- kfree(fs_info->allowlist);
- fs_info->allowlist = buf;
+ write_lock_irqsave(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
+ if (recreate_allowlist(fs_info, seq_file->buf, seq_file->count) < 0) {
write_unlock_irqrestore(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
+ return -EIO;
}
+
+ shrink_dcache_sb(inode->i_sb);
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&fs_info->allowlist_lock, flags);
}
return single_release(inode, file);
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 6e9b125072e5..18436d70bb12 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -147,18 +147,6 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
return 0;
}
-static char *proc_init_allowlist(void)
-{
- char *content = kstrdup("allowlist\n", GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
-
- if (!content) {
- pr_err("proc_init_allowlist: allocation allowlist failed\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return content;
-}
-
static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
struct fs_context *fc,
struct user_namespace *user_ns)
@@ -171,11 +159,8 @@ static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset)) {
fs_info->subset = ctx->subset;
- if (ctx->subset & PROC_SUBSET_ALLOWLIST) {
- fs_info->allowlist = proc_init_allowlist();
- } else {
- fs_info->allowlist = NULL;
- }
+ if (ctx->subset & PROC_SUBSET_ALLOWLIST)
+ proc_allowlist_append(&fs_info->allowlist, "allowlist", 10);
}
}
@@ -191,6 +176,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
return -ENOMEM;
rwlock_init(&fs_info->allowlist_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fs_info->allowlist);
fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
@@ -296,7 +282,7 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
kill_anon_super(sb);
put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
- kfree(fs_info->allowlist);
+ proc_allowlist_free(&fs_info->allowlist);
kfree(fs_info);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
index 08d0d0ae6e42..81c6b4b2ae97 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ enum proc_subset {
PROC_SUBSET_ALLOWLIST = (1 << 2),
};
+struct allowlist_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ char *path;
+};
+
struct proc_fs_info {
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
struct dentry *proc_self; /* For /proc/self */
@@ -66,8 +71,8 @@ struct proc_fs_info {
kgid_t pid_gid;
enum proc_hidepid hide_pid;
unsigned int subset;
- char *allowlist;
rwlock_t allowlist_lock;
+ struct list_head allowlist;
};
static inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb_info(struct super_block *sb)
--
2.33.6
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