linux-kernel - Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

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Date:   Wed, 25 Jan 2023 19:47:38 +0100 (CET)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
cc:     "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>,
        "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>,
        "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>,
        "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@...el.com>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        "Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        "jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>,
        "pgonda@...gle.com" <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        "Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>,
        "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

On Wed, 25 Jan 2023, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> Argument that it doesn't work?  I thought that ship sailed a long time 
> ago but I could be wrong as I don't really pay attention to that stuff 
> as it's just vaporware :)

Greg, are you sure you are talking about *SEV-SNP* here? (*)

That ship hasn't sailed as far as I can tell, it's being actively worked 
on.

With SEV-SNP launch attestation, FDE, and runtime remote attestation (**) 
one thing that you get is a way how to ensure that the guest image that 
you have booted in a (public) cloud hasn't been tampered with, even if you 
have zero trust in the cloud provider and their hypervisor.

And that without the issues and side-channels previous SEV and SEV-ES had.

Which to me is a rather valid usecase in today's world, rather than 
vaporware.

(*) and corresponding Intel-TDX support counterpart, once it exists

(**) which is not necessarily a kernel work of course, but rather 
     userspace integration work, e.g. based on Keylime

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs