linux-kernel - Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <Y9JyW5bUqV7gWmU8@unreal>
Date:   Thu, 26 Jan 2023 14:30:19 +0200
From:   Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
To:     "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>,
        "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>,
        "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>,
        "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@...el.com>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        "Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        "jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>,
        "pgonda@...gle.com" <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        "Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>,
        "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 11:29:20AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:29:07PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > Replying only to the not-so-far addressed points.
> > >
> > > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:28:13PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > > > Hi Greg,
> > 
> > <...>
> > 
> > > > > 3) All the tools are open-source and everyone can start using them right
> > away
> > > > even
> > > > > without any special HW (readme has description of what is needed).
> > > > > Tools and documentation is here:
> > > > > https://github.com/intel/ccc-linux-guest-hardening
> > > >
> > > > Again, as our documentation states, when you submit patches based on
> > > > these tools, you HAVE TO document that.  Otherwise we think you all are
> > > > crazy and will get your patches rejected.  You all know this, why ignore
> > > > it?
> > >
> > > Sorry, I didn’t know that for every bug that is found in linux kernel when
> > > we are submitting a fix that we have to list the way how it has been found.
> > > We will fix this in the future submissions, but some bugs we have are found by
> > > plain code audit, so 'human' is the tool.
> > 
> > My problem with that statement is that by applying different threat
> > model you "invent" bugs which didn't exist in a first place.
> > 
> > For example, in this [1] latest submission, authors labeled correct
> > behaviour as "bug".
> > 
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119170633.40944-1-
> > alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com/
> 
> Hm.. Does everyone think that when kernel dies with unhandled page fault 
> (such as in that case) or detection of a KASAN out of bounds violation (as it is in some
> other cases we already have fixes or investigating) it represents a correct behavior even if
> you expect that all your pci HW devices are trusted? 

This is exactly what I said. You presented me the cases which exist in
your invented world. Mentioned unhandled page fault doesn't exist in real
world. If PCI device doesn't work, it needs to be replaced/blocked and not
left to be operable and accessible from the kernel/user.

> What about an error in two consequent pci reads? What about just some
> failure that results in erroneous input?

Yes, some bugs need to be fixed, but they are not related to trust/not-trust
discussion and PCI spec violations.

Thanks

> 
> Best Regards,
> Elena.
>