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Message-ID: <CAFLxGvyMncqjkEXiOqenQu+rZW46RP7UorXs36+awmgnBxTGhA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 16:13:11 +0100
From: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
"Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>,
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"Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@...el.com>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
"jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>,
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"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
"Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>,
"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing
On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 3:58 PM Dr. David Alan Gilbert
<dgilbert@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> * Richard Weinberger (richard.weinberger@...il.com) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:22 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > Any virtual device exposed to the guest that can transfer potentially
> > > sensitive data needs to have some form of guest controlled encryption
> > > applied. For disks this is easy with FDE like LUKS, for NICs this is
> > > already best practice for services by using TLS. Other devices may not
> > > have good existing options for applying encryption.
> >
> > I disagree wrt. LUKS. The cryptography behind LUKS protects persistent data
> > but not transport. If an attacker can observe all IO you better
> > consult a cryptographer.
> > LUKS has no concept of session keys or such, so the same disk sector will
> > always get encrypted with the very same key/iv.
>
> Are you aware of anything that you'd use instead?
Well, I'd think towards iSCSI over TLS to protect the IO transport.
> Are you happy with dm-verity for protection against modification?
Like LUKS (actually dm-crypt) the crypto behind is designed to protect
persistent data not transport.
My fear is that an attacker who is able to observe IOs can do bad things.
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