lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20230126112058-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:25:21 -0500
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>
Cc:     Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@...el.com>,
        "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>,
        "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...el.com>,
        "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        "Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "aarcange@...hat.com" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        "jbachmann@...gle.com" <jbachmann@...gle.com>,
        "pgonda@...gle.com" <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        "Lange, Jon" <jlange@...rosoft.com>,
        "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@...wei.com>,
        linux-pci@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 04:44:49PM +0100, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> Obviously the host can DoS guest access to the device by modifying
> exchanged messages, but there are much simpler ways for it to
> do that, say, by clearing Bus Master Enable or Memory Space Enable
> bits in the Command Register.

There's a single key per guest though, isn't it? Also used
for regular memory?


-- 
MST

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ