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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQiy9vP7BdQk+SXG7gQKAqOAqbYtU+c9R0_ym0h4bgG7g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 17:43:02 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc: Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, io-uring@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Stefan Roesch <shr@...com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise.
>
> Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
> Fixes: a56834e0fafe ("io_uring: add fgetxattr and getxattr support")
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> ---
> io_uring/opdef.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Depending on your security policy, fetching file data, including
xattrs, can be interesting from a security perspective. As an
example, look at the SELinux file/getattr permission.
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-notebook/blob/main/src/object_classes_permissions.md#common-file-permissions
> diff --git a/io_uring/opdef.c b/io_uring/opdef.c
> index a2bf53b4a38a..f6bfe2cf078c 100644
> --- a/io_uring/opdef.c
> +++ b/io_uring/opdef.c
> @@ -462,12 +462,14 @@ const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
> },
> [IORING_OP_FGETXATTR] = {
> .needs_file = 1,
> + .audit_skip = 1,
> .name = "FGETXATTR",
> .prep = io_fgetxattr_prep,
> .issue = io_fgetxattr,
> .cleanup = io_xattr_cleanup,
> },
> [IORING_OP_GETXATTR] = {
> + .audit_skip = 1,
> .name = "GETXATTR",
> .prep = io_getxattr_prep,
> .issue = io_getxattr,
> --
> 2.27.0
--
paul-moore.com
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