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Message-Id: <ceac106b-ddac-4ee6-bfdf-1505cc699eaa@app.fastmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Jan 2023 08:59:32 -0500
From: "Colin Walters" <walters@...bum.org>
To: "Giuseppe Scrivano" <gscrivan@...hat.com>,
"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@...har.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@...omium.org>,
bristot@...hat.com, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@...nel.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"Alexander Larsson" <alexl@...hat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@...radead.org>, bmasney@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
On Wed, Jan 25, 2023, at 11:30 AM, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
>
> After reading some comments on the LWN.net article, I wonder if
> PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE should apply to CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user
> namespace or if in this case root should keep the privilege to inspect
> the binary of a process. If a container runs with that many privileges
> then it has already other ways to damage the host anyway.
Right, that's what I was trying to express with the "make it work the same as map_files". Hiding the entry entirely even for initial-namespace-root (real root) seems like it's going to potentially confuse profiling/tracing/debugging tools for no good reason.
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