[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <5f37bdef-5447-8def-7bb0-a498879abc4c@quicinc.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 10:49:37 +0800
From: Linyu Yuan <quic_linyyuan@...cinc.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
CC: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] trace: acquire buffer from temparary trace sequence
On 1/31/2023 10:37 AM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 31 Jan 2023 10:06:22 +0800
> Linyu Yuan <quic_linyyuan@...cinc.com> wrote:
>
>> yes, agree it will be safe for dwc3, but i don't know if any possible
>> hacker,
>>
>> as the function always return a valid pointer even when hacker input a
>> large size.
> But gives a nice big warning if that's the case. This is not something that
> can be modified by user input. We do not need to worry about
> kernel implementations that could overflow (and trigger a WARN_ON() when
> they do). Especially since the max size is greater than the max size of the
> content of an event.
>
> A lot of systems that worry about hackers enable "panic_on_warn" which
> means that if the WARN_ON() triggers, the machine will crash, which will at
> most cause a DOS, but not something people can use to hack into the machine
> with.
thanks, please help review the change.
>
> -- Steve
Powered by blists - more mailing lists