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Message-ID: <75765583-1807-e5eb-80c4-255ff772ad8c@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 11:52:30 -0600
From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com,
pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, harald@...fian.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
On 1/30/2023 7:54 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>
>
> On 11/1/23 13:01, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> On 1/10/2023 6:48 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> On 10/1/23 19:33, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 1/9/2023 8:28 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 10/1/23 10:41, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/8/2023 9:33 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>>>> On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
>>>>>>>> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP
>>>>>>>> guest to
>>>>>>>> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
>>>>>>>> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
>>>>>>>> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed
>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
>>>>>>>> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM
>>>>>>>> to get
>>>>>>>> both the report and certificate data at once.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185
>>>>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
>>>>>>>> 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>>>>> index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>>>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>>>>> if (ret)
>>>>>>>> goto e_free;
>>>>>>>> + mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>>>>> ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false);
>>>>>>>> } else {
>>>>>>>> ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
>>>>>>>> @@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct
>>>>>>>> kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
>>>>>>>> */
>>>>>>>> static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>>>>>>>> kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>>>>> struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
>>>>>>>> - void *context;
>>>>>>>> + void *context, *certs_data;
>>>>>>>> int rc;
>>>>>>>> + /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest
>>>>>>>> request */
>>>>>>>> + certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE,
>>>>>>>> GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>>>>> + if (!certs_data)
>>>>>>>> + return NULL;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> /* Allocate memory for context page */
>>>>>>>> context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>>>>> if (!context)
>>>>>>>> - return NULL;
>>>>>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>>>>>> data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
>>>>>>>> rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd,
>>>>>>>> SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);
>>>>>>>> - if (rc) {
>>>>>>>> - snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>>>>> - return NULL;
>>>>>>>> - }
>>>>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>>>>>>>> return context;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +e_free:
>>>>>>>> + snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>>>>> + kfree(certs_data);
>>>>>>>> + return NULL;
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>> static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
>>>>>>>> @@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct
>>>>>>>> kvm *kvm)
>>>>>>>> snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
>>>>>>>> sev->snp_context = NULL;
>>>>>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> return 0;
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>> @@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct
>>>>>>>> vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
>>>>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>>>>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
>>>>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
>>>>>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>>>>> break;
>>>>>>>> default:
>>>>>>>> reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
>>>>>>>> @@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct
>>>>>>>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>>>>> return 1;
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
>>>>>>>> + gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>>>>> + kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) ||
>>>>>>>> !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa, PAGE_SIZE))
>>>>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
>>>>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
>>>>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
>>>>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
>>>>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
>>>>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
>>>>>>>> + data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>>>>> + data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct
>>>>>>>> sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
>>>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
>>>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>>>>> gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>>>>> + unsigned long rc;
>>>>>>>> + int err;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data,
>>>>>>>> &err);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>>>>> + /* use the firmware error code */
>>>>>>>> + rc = err;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +unlock:
>>>>>>>> + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +e_fail:
>>>>>>>> + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
>>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>>>>> gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>>>>> + unsigned long data_npages;
>>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>>>>> + unsigned long rc, err;
>>>>>>>> + u64 data_gpa;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>>>>>>>> + data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
>>>>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned
>>>>>>>> long)sev->snp_certs_data,
>>>>>>>> + &data_npages, &err);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> but this one does not and jump straight to
>>>>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can
>>>>>>> these two be unified? sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks
>>>>>>> if fd is /dev/sev which is hardly useful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended
>>>>>>> attestation report" added this one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST additionally returns a certificate blob and
>>>>>> that's why it goes through the CCP driver interface
>>>>>> snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used to get both the report
>>>>>> and certificate data/blob at the same time.
>>>>>
>>>>> True. I thought though that this calls for extending
>>>>> sev_issue_cmd() to take care of these extra parameters rather than
>>>>> just skipping the sev->fd.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> All the FW API calls on the KVM side go through sev_issue_cmd()
>>>>>> and sev_issue_cmd_external_user() interfaces and that i believe
>>>>>> uses sev->fd more of as a sanity check.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does not look like it:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c?h=v6.2-rc3#n1290
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ===
>>>>> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
>>>>> void *data, int *error)
>>>>> {
>>>>> if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
>>>>> return -EBADF;
>>>>>
>>>>> return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
>>>>> }
>>>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
>>>>> ===
>>>>>
>>>>> The only "more" is that it requires sev->fd to be a valid open fd,
>>>>> what is the value in that? I may easily miss the bigger picture
>>>>> here. Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Have a look at following functions in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:
>>>> sev_dev_init() and sev_misc_init().
>>>>
>>>> static int sev_misc_init(struct sev_device *sev)
>>>> {
>>>> struct device *dev = sev->dev;
>>>> int ret;
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but
>>>> * the SEV FW commands must be issued on the master. During
>>>> * probe, we do not know the master hence we create
>>>> /dev/sev on
>>>> * the first device probe.
>>>> * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to
>>>> issue
>>>> * the command to the firmware.
>>>> */
>>>
>>>
>>> It is still a single /dev/sev node and the userspace cannot get it
>>> wrong, it does not have to choose between (for instance) /dev/sev0
>>> and /dev/sev1 on a 2 SOC system.
>>>
>>>> ...
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> Hence, sev_issue_cmd_external_user() needs to ensure that the
>>>> correct device (master device) is being operated upon and that's why
>>>> there is the check for file operations matching sev_fops as below :
>>>>
>>>> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
>>>> void *data, int *error)
>>>> {
>>>> if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
>>>> return -EBADF;
>>>> ..
>>>> ..
>>>>
>>>> Essentially, sev->fd is the misc. device created for the master PSP
>>>> device on which the SEV/SNP firmware commands are issued, hence,
>>>> sev_issue_cmd() uses sev->fd.
>>>
>>> There is always just one fd which always uses psp_master, nothing
>>> from that fd is used.
>>
>> It also ensures that we can only issue commands (sev_issue_cmd) after
>> SEV/SNP guest has launched.
>
> I can open /dev/sev and start sending commands to the firmware with no
> KVM running at all. Oh well, we discussed this offline :)
>
Yes, and as we already discussed we need to support that to get SEV/SNP
platform status (SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS) and also for legacy SEV commands
like certificate generation and import/export which can be issued before
a VM is launched.
Thanks,
Ashish
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