linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC v7 11/64] KVM: SEV: Support private pages in LAUNCH_UPDATE

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Message-ID: <Y9qt50zW+eJcz7cm@zn.tnic>
Date:   Wed, 1 Feb 2023 19:22:31 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
        luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com,
        pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, vbabka@...e.cz,
        kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        alpergun@...gle.com, dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        ashish.kalra@....com, harald@...fian.com,
        Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 11/64] KVM: SEV: Support private pages in
 LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 01:40:03PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
> 
> Pre-boot guest payload needs to be encrypted and VMM has copied it

"has to have copied it over" I presume?

> over to the private-fd. Add support to get the pfn from the memfile fd
> for encrypting the payload in-place.

Why is that a good thing?

I guess with UPM you're supposed to get the PFN of that encrypted guest
payload from that memslot.

IOW, such commit messages are too laconic for my taste and you could try
to explain more why this is happening instead of me having to
"reverse-deduce" what you're doing from the code...

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette