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Message-ID: <20230203182045.GA1972366@bhelgaas>
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 12:20:45 -0600
From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@...nel.org>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
Cc: Baolu Lu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Matt Fagnani <matt.fagnani@...l.net>,
Christian König <christian.koenig@....com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@....com>,
Tony Zhu <tony.zhu@...el.com>, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org,
iommu@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] PCI: Add translated request only flag for
pci_enable_pasid()
[+cc Alex in case you're interested in the ACS angle]
On Thu, Feb 02, 2023 at 04:45:05PM -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 02, 2023 at 02:12:49PM -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 02, 2023 at 11:08:25AM +0800, Baolu Lu wrote:
> > > ...
> >
> > > ACS is unnecessary for the devices that only use translated
> > > memory request for PASID. All translated addresses are granted
> > > by the Linux kernel which ensures that such addresses will never
> > > be in a P2P address, i.e., it's not contained in any bridge
> > > aperture, will *always* be routed toward the RC.
> >
> > Re 201007ef707a ("PCI: Enable PASID only when ACS RR & UF enabled
> > on upstream path"), does that commit actually *fix* anything? I
> > wonder whether we could revert it completely.
> >
> > The intent of 201007ef707a is to use ACS to prevent misrouting,
> > which would happen if a TLP contained an address that *looked*
> > like a PCI bus address, i.e., it was inside a host bridge
> > aperture, but was *intended* to reach an IOMMU or main memory
> > directly.
>
> Yes.
>
> > 201007ef707a only affects pci_enable_pasid(), so I think we
> > already avoid this misrouting by restricting DMA address
> > allocation for both non-IOMMU scenarios and non-PASID IOMMU
> > scenarios.
>
> There is no restriction on DMA address allocation with PASID.
>
> The typical PASID use case is to point the PASID at the CPU page
> table and then all VA's are fair game by userspace. There is no
> carve out like the DMA API has to protect from bus address
> confusion.
I think you're saying that for (Requester ID, PASID, Untranslated
Address), the Untranslated Address is not restricted at all, and it
may look like a PCI bus address.
> > So what about PASID mappings, e.g., consider a mapping of
> > (Requester ID, PASID, Untranslated Address) -> Translated Address?
> > If either the Untranslated Address or the Translated Address looks
> > like a PCI bus address, a Memory Request or Translation Request
> > could be misrouted.
>
> The PCI rules are a bit complicated:
> - A simple MemRd/Wr with a PASID will be routed according to the
> address. This can be mis-routed
> - A ATS translation request with a PASID is always routed to the host
> bridge
>From a PCIe point of view, I think these cases are equivalent because
a PASID prefix doesn't affect routing (sec 2.2.10.4). A Translation
Request includes an Untranslated Address, and if that happens to look
like a PCI bus address, I think it will be mis-routed just like a
MemRd/Wr would be.
> - A MemRd/Wr with Translated set and no PASID is always routed to the
> correct destination, even if that is not the host bridge
I don't think Address Type 10b ("Translated") affects routing. A
MemRd/Wr should be routed to a PCI peer if the Translated Address is
inside a host bridge aperture, or to the host bridge otherwise.
> > Do IOMMUs allocate (PASID, Untranslated Addresses) that look like
> > PCI bus addresses?
>
> Yes, because it is mapped to a mm_struct userspace can use any mmap
> to access any valid address as an IOVA and thus PASID tagged
> translation must never become confused with bus addresses.
If PCI bus addresses are carved out of the Translated Address arena,
the MemRd/Wr TLPs should be fine, but I think the Translation Requests
that include Untranslated Addresses are still a problem.
> Further, and worse, the common use model for PASID SVA is for
> userspace to directly submit IOVA to the device for operation. If
> userspace can submit a hostile IOVA and cause DMA to reach something
> that is not the host bridge then system security is completely
> wrecked.
>
> So, as an API in Linux we felt it was best to only enable PASID if
> PASID is secure and truely isolated, otherwise leave PASID off. The
> use cases for insecure PASID seem small.
The patch under discussion is intended to fix a v6.2-rc1 regression
added by 201007ef707a ("PCI: Enable PASID only when ACS RR & UF
enabled on upstream path").
Are we on track to fix this before v6.2? I don't have a clear
understanding of how we know this change is safe and it only affects
AMD GPU and not other devices below the same IOMMU.
Bjorn
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