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Message-ID: <d6efb292273eee6caff9afc8b64e42984a3ae517.camel@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2023 11:16:45 +0100
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stefanb@...ux.ibm.com,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, pvorel@...e.cz,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ima-evm-utils v5] Add tests for MMAP_CHECK and
MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks
On Mon, 2023-02-06 at 08:20 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2023-02-03 at 13:56 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> >
> > Add tests to ensure that, after applying the kernel patch 'ima: Align
> > ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook', the MMAP_CHECK hook
> > checks the protections applied by the kernel and not those requested by the
> > application.
> >
> > Also ensure that after applying 'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook',
> > the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook checks the protections requested by the
> > application.
> >
> > Test both with the test_mmap application that by default requests the
> > PROT_READ protection flag. Its syntax is:
> >
> > test_mmap <file> <mode>
> >
> > where mode can be:
> > - exec: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to mmap()
> > - read_implies_exec: calls the personality() system call with
> > READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument before mmap()
> > - mprotect: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to a memory area in addition
> > to PROT_READ
> > - exec_on_writable: calls mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file which has a
> > writable mapping
> >
> > Check the different combinations of hooks/modes and ensure that a
> > measurement entry is found in the IMA measurement list only when it is
> > expected. No measurement entry should be found when only the PROT_READ
> > protection flag is requested or the matching policy rule has the
> > MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook and the personality() system call was called with
> > READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.
> >
> > mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on an existing memory area protected with
> > PROT_READ should be denied (with an appraisal rule), regardless of the MMAP
> > hook specified in the policy. The same applies for mmap() with PROT_EXEC on
> > a file with a writable mapping.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> Thanks, Roberto. Other than the one comment below, it looks good.
>
> > +
> > +if ! awk '$0 ~ /^(measure|appraise)/ && $0 !~ /fsuuid=/ && $0 !~ /fowner=/ { exit 1 }' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy; then
> > + echo "${CYAN}IMA policy rules without fsuuid= and fowner=, cannot continue due to possible interference with the tests${NORM}"
> > + exit "$SKIP"
> > +fi
>
> The test should be limited to just MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
> policy rules.
>
> +if ! awk '$0 ~ /^(measure|appraise)/ && $0 ~ /func=MMAP_CHECK/ && $0 !~ /fsuuid=/ && ...
Oh, yes. Better.
Thanks
Roberto
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