linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: machine keyring CA configuration

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Date:   Fri, 10 Feb 2023 22:42:02 +0000
From:   Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
CC:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "dwmw2@...radead.org" <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        "paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "pvorel@...e.cz" <pvorel@...e.cz>,
        "tadeusz.struk@...el.com" <tadeusz.struk@...el.com>,
        Kanth Ghatraju <kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com>,
        Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        "erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "coxu@...hat.com" <coxu@...hat.com>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: machine keyring CA configuration



> On Feb 10, 2023, at 6:05 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Eric,
> 
> On Mon, 2023-02-06 at 21:59 -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Add a machine keyring CA restriction menu option to control the type of
>> keys that may be added to it. The options include none, min and max
>> restrictions.
>> 
>> When no restrictions are selected, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added
>> to the machine keyring.  When CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MIN is
>> selected, the CA bit must be true.  Also the key usage must contain
>> keyCertSign, any other usage field may be set as well.
>> 
>> When CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX is selected, the CA bit must
>> be true. Also the key usage must contain keyCertSign and the
>> digitialSignature usage may not be set.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
> 
> Missing from the patch description is the motivation for this change.  
> The choices none, min, max implies a progression, which is good, and
> the technical differences between the choices, but not the reason.
> 
> The motivation, at least from my perspective, is separation of
> certificate signing from code signing keys, where "none" is no
> separation and "max" being total separation of keys based on usage.
> 
> Subsequent work, as discussed in the cover letter thread, will limit
> certificates being loaded onto the IMA keyring to code signing keys
> used for signature verification.

I will include this in the next round too, thanks.