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Message-ID: <6257114d-a957-f586-145c-d2a885417360@suse.com>
Date:   Mon, 13 Feb 2023 15:07:07 +0100
From:   Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        lists@...dbynature.de, mikelley@...rosoft.com,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/mtrr: support setting MTRR state for software
 defined MTRRs

On 13.02.23 12:39, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 08:22:14AM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> When running virtualized, MTRR access can be reduced (e.g. in Xen PV
>> guests or when running as a SEV-SNP guest under Hyper-V). Typically
>> the hypervisor will reset the MTRR feature in cpuid data, resulting
>> in no MTRR memory type information being available for the kernel.
>>
>> This has turned out to result in problems:
>>
>> - Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using uncached mappings where they shouldn't
>> - Xen PV dom0 mapping memory as WB which should be UC- instead
>>
>> Solve those problems by supporting to set a fixed MTRR state,
>> overwriting the empty state used today. In case such a state has been
>> set, don't call get_mtrr_state() in mtrr_bp_init(). The set state
>> will only be used by mtrr_type_lookup(), as in all other cases
>> mtrr_enabled() is being checked, which will return false. Accept the
>> overwrite call only in case of MTRRs being disabled in cpuid.
> 
> s/cpuid/CPUID/g

Okay.

> 
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
>> ---
>> V2:
>> - new patch
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/mtrr.h        |  2 ++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c    |  9 +++++++
>>   3 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mtrr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mtrr.h
>> index f0eeaf6e5f5f..0b8f51d683dc 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mtrr.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mtrr.h
>> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
>>    */
>>   # ifdef CONFIG_MTRR
>>   void mtrr_bp_init(void);
>> +void mtrr_overwrite_state(struct mtrr_var_range *var, unsigned int num_var,
>> +			  mtrr_type *fixed, mtrr_type def_type);
>>   extern u8 mtrr_type_lookup(u64 addr, u64 end, u8 *uniform);
>>   extern void mtrr_save_fixed_ranges(void *);
>>   extern void mtrr_save_state(void);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
>> index ee09d359e08f..788bc16888a5 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
>> @@ -240,6 +240,44 @@ static u8 mtrr_type_lookup_variable(u64 start, u64 end, u64 *partial_end,
>>   	return mtrr_state.def_type;
>>   }
>>   
>> +/**
>> + * mtrr_overwrite_state - set fixed MTRR state
> 
> fixed only? You pass in variable too...

Fixed in the sense of static.

> 
>> + *
>> + * Used to set MTRR state via different means (e.g. with data obtained from
>> + * a hypervisor).
>> + */
>> +void mtrr_overwrite_state(struct mtrr_var_range *var, unsigned int num_var,
>> +			  mtrr_type *fixed, mtrr_type def_type)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned int i;
>> +
>> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MTRR))
> 
> check_for_deprecated_apis: WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c:254: Do not use boot_cpu_has() - use cpu_feature_enabled() instead.

Okay.

> 
>> +		return;
> 
> So this here needs to check:
> 
> 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
> 	    !(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) ||
> 	      cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))) {
> 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
> as we don't want this to be called somewhere or by something else.

Wouldn't !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) be enough?

I'm not sure we won't need that for TDX guests, too.

> 
> The SEV_SNP flag can be used from:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214194056.161492-14-michael.roth@amd.com
> 
> I'm assuming here HyperV SEV-SNP guests really do set that feature flag
> (they better). We can expedite that patch ofc.
> 
> And for dom0 I *think* we use X86_FEATURE_XENPV but I leave that to you.

Yes, it is only relevant for PV dom0.

> 
>> +
>> +	if (var) {
>> +		if (num_var > MTRR_MAX_VAR_RANGES) {
>> +			pr_warn("Trying to overwrite MTRR state with %u variable entries\n",
>> +				num_var);
> 
> What's that check for? Sanity of callers?

Yes.

> 
>> +			num_var = MTRR_MAX_VAR_RANGES;
>> +		}
>> +		for (i = 0; i < num_var; i++)
>> +			mtrr_state.var_ranges[i] = var[i];
>> +		num_var_ranges = num_var;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (fixed) {
>> +		for (i = 0; i < MTRR_NUM_FIXED_RANGES; i++)
> 
> You're not doing this sanity check here, expecting that callers would
> know what they're doing...

The number of fixed MTRRs is not dynamic AFAIK.

> 
>> +			mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[i] = fixed[i];
>> +		mtrr_state.enabled |= MTRR_STATE_MTRR_FIXED_ENABLED;
>> +		mtrr_state.have_fixed = 1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	mtrr_state.def_type = def_type;
>> +	mtrr_state.enabled |= MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED;
>> +
>> +	mtrr_state_set = 1;
>> +}
> 
> I can't say that I'm crazy about the call sites:
> 
> 	mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, NULL, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
> 
> This looks like it wants a
> 
> 	mtrr_override_def_type(MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
> 
> instead of passing in all those nulls as params.
> 
> This:
> 
> 	mtrr_overwrite_state(var, reg, NULL, MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE);
> 
> I guess is a bit better.
> 
> Dunno, if it is only those two callers we can say, meh, whatever, this
> interface is not pretty but does the job at least. But if more users
> start popping up then I guess we can do
> 
> 	mtrr_override_fixed()
> 	mtrr_override_variable()
> 	mtrr_override_def_type()

A single interface makes it easier to avoid multiple calls.

In the end I'm fine with either way.

> 
> ...
> 
> 
>>   /**
>>    * mtrr_type_lookup - look up memory type in MTRR
>>    *
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c
>> index 542ca5639dfd..b73fe243c7fd 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c
>> @@ -668,6 +668,15 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
>>   	const char *why = "(not available)";
>>   	unsigned int phys_addr;
>>   
>> +	if (mtrr_state.enabled) {
> 
> Not crazy about this either: this relies on the fragile boot ordering
> where init_hypervisor_platform() runs before this so it has a chance
> that mtrr_state.enabled will be already set.
> 
> Yeah, yeah, cache_bp_init() and all the MTRR BSP setup stuff happens
> after it but there should at least be a comment over
> init_hypervisor_platform()'s call site in setup_arch() stating that
> cache_bp_init() needs to happen *after* it because <reason>.

I'll add that comment.

> 
> I think we should also check
> 
> 	x86_hyper_type
> 
> here and not do anything if not set. As this is all HV-related muck.
> 
> Xen I guess is a bit better because that call there happens even earlier
> but we need the comments to say that the ordering matters because future
> reorganization could cause it to blow up and people would search
> themselves crazy why in the hell it breaks...
> 
> Can Xen use x86_hyper_type() too?

It does.


Juergen

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