linux-kernel - Re: [PING][PATCH v3] x86: Use `get_random_u8' for kernel stack offset randomization

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.2302140447190.6368@angie.orcam.me.uk>
Date:   Tue, 14 Feb 2023 04:54:53 +0000 (GMT)
From:   "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PING][PATCH v3] x86: Use `get_random_u8' for kernel stack offset
 randomization

On Mon, 13 Feb 2023, Thomas Gleixner wrote:

> >> For x86 kernel stack offset randomization uses the RDTSC instruction, 
> >> which according to H. Peter Anvin is not a secure source of entropy:
> >> 
> >> "RDTSC isn't a super fast instruction either, but what is *way* more
> >> significant is that this use of RDTSC is NOT safe: in certain power states
> >> it may very well be that stone number of lower bits of TSC contain no
> >> entropy at all."
> >
> >  Ping for:
> > <https://lore.kernel.org/all/alpine.DEB.2.21.2301302011150.55843@angie.orcam.me.uk/>.
> 
> I'm waiting for you to address Peter Anvins feedback.

 Do you mean this part:

On Tue, 31 Jan 2023, H. Peter Anvin wrote:

> Well, what I said was that masking out the low bits of TSC is not a valid use to
> extract a random(-ish) number this way, because the lower bits may be affected
> by quantization. Something like a circular multiply using a large prime with a
> good 0:1 balance can be used to mitigate that.
> 
> However, the second part is that subsequent RDTSCs will be highly correlated,
> and so a CSPRNG is needed if you are actually trying to get reasonable security
> this way – and, well, we already have one of those.

?  Well, I inferred, perhaps incorrectly, from the second paragraph that 
Peter agrees with my approach (with the CSPRNG being what `get_random_u8' 
and friends get at).

> You also cite him
> w/o providing a link to the conversation, so any context is missing.

 Sorry about that.  I put the change heading for the previous iterations 
in the change log, but I agree actual web links would've been better:
<https://lore.kernel.org/all/alpine.DEB.2.21.2301081919550.65308@angie.orcam.me.uk/>,
<https://lore.kernel.org/all/alpine.DEB.2.21.2301082113350.65308@angie.orcam.me.uk/>.

 Please let me know if you need anything else.  Thank you for your review.

  Maciej