| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20230218211433.26859-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2023 13:13:52 -0800
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@....com>, kcc@...gle.com,
eranian@...gle.com, rppt@...nel.org, jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com,
dethoma@...rosoft.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com, christina.schimpe@...el.com,
david@...hat.com, debug@...osinc.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace
Hi,
This series implements Shadow Stacks for userspace using x86's Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features:
shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the
shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return
oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow)
stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification.
When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to
both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET,
the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack
copy. For more details, see the coverletter from v1 [0].
The main changes in this version are the MM suggestions by David Hildenbrand
to have pte_mkwrite() take a vma, and rename _PAGE_COW.
The former is split over three patches:
mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel()
s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel()
mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA
With these changes, and an adjustment to "mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in
wrong vma", references to "shstk" are now only in x86 arch code, hopefully
addressing Andrew Morton's concerns. There are still a couple VM_SHADOW_STACK
references, which seems to be in keeping with the treatment of other
VM_HIGH_ARCH flags. If other shadow stack implementations end up with identical
logic, it can easily be refactored at that point.
There was also some more feedback from Boris which was incorporated.
I left tested-by tags in place per discussion with testers. Testers, please
retest.
Previous version [1].
Thanks,
Rick
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack
Mike Rapoport (1):
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
Rick Edgecombe (19):
x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate
x86: Move control protection handler to separate file
mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel()
s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel()
mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA
x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory
mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory
x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G
mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma
x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
Yu-cheng Yu (20):
Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38
mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
Documentation/mm/arch_pgtable_helpers.rst | 9 +-
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 176 +++++
arch/alpha/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/arc/include/asm/hugepage.h | 2 +-
arch/arc/include/asm/pgtable-bits-arcv2.h | 7 +-
arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 7 +-
arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 9 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/mm/trans_pgd.c | 4 +-
arch/csky/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/hexagon/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/ia64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h | 4 +-
arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/m68k/include/asm/motorola_pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/microblaze/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/nios2/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/openrisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/64/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/hugetlb.h | 4 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 14 +-
arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 4 +-
arch/sh/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 10 +-
arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 2 +-
arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 6 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 2 +-
arch/um/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 +
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 16 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 9 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 16 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 11 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 322 ++++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 71 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 8 +
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 40 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 13 +
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 12 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 12 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 152 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 35 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 23 +
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 59 +-
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 86 +++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 148 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 18 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 491 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 8 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 87 ---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 38 +
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 38 +
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 2 +-
arch/xtensa/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +-
fs/aio.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/array.c | 6 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
include/asm-generic/hugetlb.h | 4 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 46 +-
include/linux/mman.h | 4 +
include/linux/pgtable.h | 14 +
include/linux/proc_fs.h | 2 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 +
ipc/shm.c | 2 +-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 +
mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c | 16 +-
mm/gup.c | 2 +-
mm/huge_memory.c | 7 +-
mm/hugetlb.c | 4 +-
mm/memory.c | 5 +-
mm/migrate_device.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 12 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
mm/nommu.c | 4 +-
mm/userfaultfd.c | 2 +-
mm/util.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 4 +-
.../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 676 ++++++++++++++++++
117 files changed, 2671 insertions(+), 324 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/shstk.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
--
2.17.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists