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Date:   Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:32:01 +0100
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        John Allen <john.allen@....com>, kcc@...gle.com,
        eranian@...gle.com, rppt@...nel.org, jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com,
        dethoma@...rosoft.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com, christina.schimpe@...el.com,
        debug@...osinc.com
Cc:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY

On 18.02.23 22:14, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> Some OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than
> Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a
> new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to
> repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support
> shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit
> combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
> 
> The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW
> _before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate
> a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and*
> generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which
> supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
> 
> So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To achieve this,
> in places where Linux normally creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the
> software-defined _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY.
> In other words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead
> creates Write=0,SavedDirty=1 except for shadow stack, which is
> Write=0,Dirty=1. Further differentiated by VMA flags, these PTE bit
> combinations would be set as follows for various types of memory:
I would simplify (see below) and not repeat what the patch contains as 
comments already that detailed.

> 
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
>   - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
>     anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
>     mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the SavedDirty bit.
>     This happens in copy_present_pte().
>   - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
>     and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
>     handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
>     Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
>   - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
>     among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
>     the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
>     duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
>     shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
>     copy-on-write.
> 
> (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
>   - A shadow stack PTE.
>   - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
>     Dirty=1.
> 
> There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after
> consuming a bit for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. No space is consumed in 32-bit
> kernels because shadow stacks are not enabled there.
> 
> Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. Changes to start
> creating _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY PTEs will follow once other pieces are in place.
> 
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> 
> ---
> v6:
>   - Rename _PAGE_COW to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY (David Hildenbrand)
>   - Add _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY to _PAGE_CHG_MASK
> 
> v5:
>   - Fix log, comments and whitespace (Boris)
>   - Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
> 
> v4:
>   - Teach pte_flags_need_flush() about _PAGE_COW bit
>   - Break apart patch for better bisectability
> 
> v3:
>   - Add comment around _PAGE_TABLE in response to comment
>     from (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Check for PSE in pmd_shstk (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Get to the point quicker in commit log (Andrew Cooper)
>   - Clarify and reorder commit log for why the PTE bit examples have
>     multiple entries. Apply same changes for comment. (peterz)
>   - Fix comment that implied dirty bit for COW was a specific x86 thing
>     (peterz)
>   - Fix swapping of Write/Dirty (PeterZ)
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h      |  3 +-
>   3 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 2b423d697490..110e552eb602 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -301,6 +301,45 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * COW and other write protection operations can result in Dirty=1,Write=0
> + * PTEs. But in the case of X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK, the software SavedDirty bit
> + * is used, since the Dirty=1,Write=0 will result in the memory being treated as
> + * shadow stack by the HW. So when creating dirty, write-protected memory, a
> + * software bit is used _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY. The following functions
> + * pte_mksaveddirty() and pte_clear_saveddirty() take a conventional dirty,
> + * write-protected PTE (Write=0,Dirty=1) and transition it to the shadow stack
> + * compatible version. (Write=0,SavedDirty=1).
> + */
> +static inline pte_t pte_mksaveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pte;
> +
> +	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pte_t pte_clear_saveddirty(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is unnecessary on !X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK kernels,
> +	 * since the HW dirty bit can be used without creating shadow stack
> +	 * memory. See the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY definition for more details.
> +	 */
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pte;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * PTE is getting copied-on-write, so it will be dirtied
> +	 * if writable, or made shadow stack if shadow stack and
> +	 * being copied on access. Set the dirty bit for both
> +	 * cases.
> +	 */
> +	pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
>   static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
>   {
> @@ -420,6 +459,26 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_mksaveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pmd;
> +
> +	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_saveddirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pmd;
> +
> +	pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
>   static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
>   {
> @@ -491,6 +550,26 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
>   	return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
>   }
>   
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_mksaveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pud;
> +
> +	pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */
> +static inline pud_t pud_clear_saveddirty(pud_t pud)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return pud;
> +
> +	pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
> +	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
>   static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
>   {
>   	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 0646ad00178b..3b420b6c0584 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2	10	/* " */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3	11	/* " */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE	12	/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
> -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	58	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	57	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5	58	/* available for programmer */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59	/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60	/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2	61	/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
> @@ -34,6 +35,15 @@
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
>   
> +/*
> + * Indicates a Saved Dirty bit page.
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY		_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */

Nope, not "copy-on-write" :) It's more like "dirty bit when the hw-dirty 
bit cannot be used". Maybe simply drop the comment.

> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY		0
> +#endif
> +
>   /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
>   /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
>   #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE	_PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
> @@ -117,6 +127,40 @@
>   #define _PAGE_SOFTW4	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
>   #endif
>   
> +/*
> + * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
> + * _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write
> + * PTEs from shadow stack PTEs:

I'd suggest phrasing this differently. COW is just one scenario where 
this can happen. Also, I don't think that the description of 
"separation" is correct.

Something like the following maybe?

"
However, there are valid cases where the kernel might create read-only 
PTEs that are dirty (e.g., fork(), mprotect(), uffd-wp(), soft-dirty 
tracking). In this case, the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY bit is used instead of 
the HW-dirty bit, to avoid creating a wrong "shadow stack" PTEs. Such 
PTEs have (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0) set.

Note that on processors without shadow stack support, the 
_PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY remains unused.
"

The I would simply drop below (which is also too COW-specific I think).

> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=1,Dirty=0):
> + *  - A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page. Previously when a typical
> + *    anonymous writable mapping was made COW via fork(), the kernel would
> + *    mark it Write=0,Dirty=1. Now it will instead use the Cow bit. This
> + *    happens in copy_present_pte().
> + *  - A R/O page that has been COW'ed. The user page is in a R/O VMA,
> + *    and get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE) needs a writable copy. The page fault
> + *    handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as
> + *    Write=0 and SavedDirty=1.
> + *  - A shared shadow stack PTE. When a shadow stack page is being shared
> + *    among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so
> + *    the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is
> + *    duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for
> + *    shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
> + *    copy-on-write.
> + *
> + * (Write=0,SavedDirty=0,Dirty=1):
> + *  - A shadow stack PTE.
> + *  - A Cow PTE created when a processor without shadow stack support set
> + *    Dirty=1.
> + */


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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