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Message-ID: <Y/O6Wr4BbtfhXrNt@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 19:22:18 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pjt@...gle.com, evn@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com, peterz@...radead.org,
pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com, kim.phillips@....com,
alexandre.chartre@...cle.com, daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com,
José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@...il.com>,
Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@...nelhacking.com>,
Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@...gle.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2
protection with KERNEL_IBRS
On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 10:01:57AM -0800, KP Singh wrote:
> Well, we disable IBRS userspace (this is KENREL_IBRS), because it is
> slow. Now if a user space process wants to protect itself from cross
> thread training, it should be able to do it, either by turning STIBP
> always on or using a prctl to enable. With the current logic, it's
> unable to do so.
Ofcourse it can:
[SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
we did this at the time so that a userspace process can control it via
prctl().
So, maybe you should explain what you're trying to accomplish in detail
and where it fails...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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