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Message-ID: <Y/O9U4KFtXE8Yoyt@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 19:34:59 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pjt@...gle.com, evn@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com, peterz@...radead.org,
pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com, kim.phillips@....com,
alexandre.chartre@...cle.com, daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com,
José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@...il.com>,
Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@...nelhacking.com>,
Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@...gle.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS
Drop stable@ again.
On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 10:27:17AM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> IBRS is only enabled in kernel space. Since it's not enabled in user
> space, user space isn't protected from indirect branch prediction
> attacks from a sibling CPU thread.
>
> Allow STIBP to be enabled to protect against such attacks.
>
> Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Yah, look at that one:
commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144
Author: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Date: Tue Jun 14 23:15:55 2022 +0200
x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.
[jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
I'm assuming this was supposed to mean no STIBP in *kernel mode* when
IBRS is selected?
In user mode, STIBP should be selectable as we disable IBRS there.
Close?
If so, pls document it too while at it:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
because we will be wondering next time again.
Like we wonder each time this madness is being touched. ;-(
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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