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Message-ID: <8b8ffa43-9003-010d-30ea-c5de128d646d@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 09:42:04 +0100
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
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Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
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Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
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Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack
memory
On 18.02.23 22:14, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
> type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
> unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
> properly.
>
> Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
> However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
> there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
> shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
> little less exposed, block writable GUPs for shadow stack VMAs.
>
> Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
> does for read-only protections.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
>
> ---
> v3:
> - Add comment in __pte_access_permitted() (Dave)
> - Remove unneeded shadow stack specific check in
> __pte_access_permitted() (Jann)
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++
> mm/gup.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 6b7106457bfb..20d0df494269 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -1641,6 +1641,11 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
> {
> unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
>
> + /*
> + * Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel
> + * shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they
> + * are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases.
> + */
> if (write)
> need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
So, GUP fast will always fail when writing ...
>
> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
> index f45a3a5be53a..bfd33d9edb89 100644
> --- a/mm/gup.c
> +++ b/mm/gup.c
> @@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> if (write) {
> - if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
> + if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
> if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
> return -EFAULT;
> /* hugetlb does not support FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE. */
and ordinary GUP without FOLL_FORCE.
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
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