linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 22 Feb 2023 13:56:40 +0000
From:   David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To:     'Borislav Petkov' <bp@...en8.de>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
CC:     Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "pjt@...gle.com" <pjt@...gle.com>,
        "evn@...gle.com" <evn@...gle.com>,
        "jpoimboe@...nel.org" <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "kim.phillips@....com" <kim.phillips@....com>,
        "alexandre.chartre@...cle.com" <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        "daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com" <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
        "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>, "bp@...e.de" <bp@...e.de>,
        "linyujun809@...wei.com" <linyujun809@...wei.com>,
        "jmattson@...gle.com" <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@...il.com>,
        Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@...nelhacking.com>,
        Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@...gle.com>,
        "stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy
 IBRS

From: Borislav Petkov
> Sent: 22 February 2023 12:33
> 
> On Tue, Feb 21, 2023 at 09:49:57PM -0800, KP Singh wrote:
> > That is a bit more complicated as, for now, the user is not really
> > exposed to STIBP explicitly yet.
> 
> Remember that we're exposing the normal user to a gazillion switches
> already. And not every user has done a PhD in hw vulns like we were
> forced to in the last, at least 5, years.

It is also worth explaining the acronyms and what the mitigations
actually do.
There are also the big family where disabling hyperthreading
is probably a better way to avoid the vulnerability.

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)