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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 11:46:25 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 6.2.1
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 135d93368d36..f77188f30210 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -3515,7 +3515,7 @@ F: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.h
AUDIT SUBSYSTEM
M: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
M: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
-L: linux-audit@...hat.com (moderated for non-subscribers)
+L: audit@...r.kernel.org
S: Supported
W: https://github.com/linux-audit
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 3f6628780eb2..f26824f367a9 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 2
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 1
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Hurr durr I'ma ninja sloth
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
index f4b87f08f5c5..29832c338cdc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
@@ -184,6 +184,37 @@ void int3_emulate_ret(struct pt_regs *regs)
unsigned long ip = int3_emulate_pop(regs);
int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
}
+
+static __always_inline
+void int3_emulate_jcc(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 cc, unsigned long ip, unsigned long disp)
+{
+ static const unsigned long jcc_mask[6] = {
+ [0] = X86_EFLAGS_OF,
+ [1] = X86_EFLAGS_CF,
+ [2] = X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
+ [3] = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
+ [4] = X86_EFLAGS_SF,
+ [5] = X86_EFLAGS_PF,
+ };
+
+ bool invert = cc & 1;
+ bool match;
+
+ if (cc < 0xc) {
+ match = regs->flags & jcc_mask[cc >> 1];
+ } else {
+ match = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) >> X86_EFLAGS_SF_BIT) ^
+ ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_OF) >> X86_EFLAGS_OF_BIT);
+ if (cc >= 0xe)
+ match = match || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
+ }
+
+ if ((match && !invert) || (!match && invert))
+ ip += disp;
+
+ int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
+}
+
#endif /* !CONFIG_UML_X86 */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TEXT_PATCHING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 7d8c3cbde368..81381a0194f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -340,6 +340,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
}
}
+static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ /* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
+ return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
+}
+
#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
/*
@@ -378,12 +384,6 @@ static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg, u8 *bytes)
return i;
}
-static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
-{
- /* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
- return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
-}
-
static int emit_call_track_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, int reg, u8 *bytes)
{
u8 op = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
@@ -1772,6 +1772,11 @@ void text_poke_sync(void)
on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1);
}
+/*
+ * NOTE: crazy scheme to allow patching Jcc.d32 but not increase the size of
+ * this thing. When len == 6 everything is prefixed with 0x0f and we map
+ * opcode to Jcc.d8, using len to distinguish.
+ */
struct text_poke_loc {
/* addr := _stext + rel_addr */
s32 rel_addr;
@@ -1893,6 +1898,10 @@ noinstr int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
int3_emulate_jmp(regs, (long)ip + tp->disp);
break;
+ case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* Jcc */
+ int3_emulate_jcc(regs, tp->opcode & 0xf, (long)ip, tp->disp);
+ break;
+
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -1966,16 +1975,26 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct text_poke_loc *tp, unsigned int nr_entries
* Second step: update all but the first byte of the patched range.
*/
for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
- u8 old[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE] = { tp[i].old, };
+ u8 old[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1] = { tp[i].old, };
+ u8 _new[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1];
+ const u8 *new = tp[i].text;
int len = tp[i].len;
if (len - INT3_INSN_SIZE > 0) {
memcpy(old + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
text_poke_addr(&tp[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+
+ if (len == 6) {
+ _new[0] = 0x0f;
+ memcpy(_new + 1, new, 5);
+ new = _new;
+ }
+
text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
- (const char *)tp[i].text + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
+ new + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+
do_sync++;
}
@@ -2003,8 +2022,7 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct text_poke_loc *tp, unsigned int nr_entries
* The old instruction is recorded so that the event can be
* processed forwards or backwards.
*/
- perf_event_text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), old, len,
- tp[i].text, len);
+ perf_event_text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), old, len, new, len);
}
if (do_sync) {
@@ -2021,10 +2039,15 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct text_poke_loc *tp, unsigned int nr_entries
* replacing opcode.
*/
for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
- if (tp[i].text[0] == INT3_INSN_OPCODE)
+ u8 byte = tp[i].text[0];
+
+ if (tp[i].len == 6)
+ byte = 0x0f;
+
+ if (byte == INT3_INSN_OPCODE)
continue;
- text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), tp[i].text, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+ text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), &byte, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
do_sync++;
}
@@ -2042,9 +2065,11 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct text_poke_loc *tp, void *addr,
const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate)
{
struct insn insn;
- int ret, i;
+ int ret, i = 0;
- memcpy((void *)tp->text, opcode, len);
+ if (len == 6)
+ i = 1;
+ memcpy((void *)tp->text, opcode+i, len-i);
if (!emulate)
emulate = opcode;
@@ -2055,6 +2080,13 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct text_poke_loc *tp, void *addr,
tp->len = len;
tp->opcode = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
+ if (is_jcc32(&insn)) {
+ /*
+ * Map Jcc.d32 onto Jcc.d8 and use len to distinguish.
+ */
+ tp->opcode = insn.opcode.bytes[1] - 0x10;
+ }
+
switch (tp->opcode) {
case RET_INSN_OPCODE:
case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
@@ -2071,7 +2103,6 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct text_poke_loc *tp, void *addr,
BUG_ON(len != insn.length);
}
-
switch (tp->opcode) {
case INT3_INSN_OPCODE:
case RET_INSN_OPCODE:
@@ -2080,6 +2111,7 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct text_poke_loc *tp, void *addr,
case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
case JMP8_INSN_OPCODE:
+ case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* Jcc */
tp->disp = insn.immediate.value;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 695873c0f50b..0ce969ae250f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -464,50 +464,26 @@ static void kprobe_emulate_call(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_call);
-static nokprobe_inline
-void __kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs, bool cond)
+static void kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
- if (cond)
- ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
+ ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
}
-
-static void kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- __kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, true);
-}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_jmp);
-static const unsigned long jcc_mask[6] = {
- [0] = X86_EFLAGS_OF,
- [1] = X86_EFLAGS_CF,
- [2] = X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
- [3] = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
- [4] = X86_EFLAGS_SF,
- [5] = X86_EFLAGS_PF,
-};
-
static void kprobe_emulate_jcc(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- bool invert = p->ainsn.jcc.type & 1;
- bool match;
+ unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
- if (p->ainsn.jcc.type < 0xc) {
- match = regs->flags & jcc_mask[p->ainsn.jcc.type >> 1];
- } else {
- match = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) >> X86_EFLAGS_SF_BIT) ^
- ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_OF) >> X86_EFLAGS_OF_BIT);
- if (p->ainsn.jcc.type >= 0xe)
- match = match || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
- }
- __kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, (match && !invert) || (!match && invert));
+ int3_emulate_jcc(regs, p->ainsn.jcc.type, ip, p->ainsn.rel32);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_jcc);
static void kprobe_emulate_loop(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
bool match;
if (p->ainsn.loop.type != 3) { /* LOOP* */
@@ -535,7 +511,9 @@ static void kprobe_emulate_loop(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
else if (p->ainsn.loop.type == 1) /* LOOPE */
match = match && (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
- __kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, match);
+ if (match)
+ ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
+ int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_loop);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
index 2ebc338980bc..b70670a98597 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ enum insn_type {
NOP = 1, /* site cond-call */
JMP = 2, /* tramp / site tail-call */
RET = 3, /* tramp / site cond-tail-call */
+ JCC = 4,
};
/*
@@ -25,12 +26,40 @@ static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x31, 0xc0 };
static const u8 retinsn[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc };
+static u8 __is_Jcc(u8 *insn) /* Jcc.d32 */
+{
+ u8 ret = 0;
+
+ if (insn[0] == 0x0f) {
+ u8 tmp = insn[1];
+ if ((tmp & 0xf0) == 0x80)
+ ret = tmp;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+extern void __static_call_return(void);
+
+asm (".global __static_call_return\n\t"
+ ".type __static_call_return, @function\n\t"
+ ASM_FUNC_ALIGN "\n\t"
+ "__static_call_return:\n\t"
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+ "ret; int3\n\t"
+ ".size __static_call_return, . - __static_call_return \n\t");
+
static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type,
void *func, bool modinit)
{
const void *emulate = NULL;
int size = CALL_INSN_SIZE;
const void *code;
+ u8 op, buf[6];
+
+ if ((type == JMP || type == RET) && (op = __is_Jcc(insn)))
+ type = JCC;
switch (type) {
case CALL:
@@ -57,6 +86,20 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type,
else
code = &retinsn;
break;
+
+ case JCC:
+ if (!func) {
+ func = __static_call_return;
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+ func = x86_return_thunk;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = 0x0f;
+ __text_gen_insn(buf+1, op, insn+1, func, 5);
+ code = buf;
+ size = 6;
+
+ break;
}
if (memcmp(insn, code, size) == 0)
@@ -68,9 +111,9 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type,
text_poke_bp(insn, code, size, emulate);
}
-static void __static_call_validate(void *insn, bool tail, bool tramp)
+static void __static_call_validate(u8 *insn, bool tail, bool tramp)
{
- u8 opcode = *(u8 *)insn;
+ u8 opcode = insn[0];
if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
pr_err("trampoline signature fail");
@@ -79,7 +122,8 @@ static void __static_call_validate(void *insn, bool tail, bool tramp)
if (tail) {
if (opcode == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE ||
- opcode == RET_INSN_OPCODE)
+ opcode == RET_INSN_OPCODE ||
+ __is_Jcc(insn))
return;
} else {
if (opcode == CALL_INSN_OPCODE ||
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c b/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
index e61dd039354b..f74a977cf8f8 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
@@ -922,6 +922,9 @@ static void mcp2221_hid_unregister(void *ptr)
/* This is needed to be sure hid_hw_stop() isn't called twice by the subsystem */
static void mcp2221_remove(struct hid_device *hdev)
{
+ struct mcp2221 *mcp = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mcp->init_work);
}
#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_IIO)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c
index b8dc3b5c9ad9..9f506efa5370 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static struct memory_type_mapping mem_type_mapping_tbl[] = {
};
static const struct of_device_id mwifiex_sdio_of_match_table[] = {
+ { .compatible = "marvell,sd8787" },
{ .compatible = "marvell,sd8897" },
{ .compatible = "marvell,sd8997" },
{ }
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig
index c375498c4071..6d89528c3177 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
config AMD_PMF
tristate "AMD Platform Management Framework"
depends on ACPI && PCI
+ depends on POWER_SUPPLY
select ACPI_PLATFORM_PROFILE
help
This driver provides support for the AMD Platform Management Framework.
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c b/drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c
index baccdf658538..1b572c90c76e 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
#include <linux/wmi.h>
#include <acpi/video.h>
+static bool force;
+module_param(force, bool, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force loading (disable acpi_backlight=xxx checks");
+
/**
* wmi_brightness_notify() - helper function for calling WMI-wrapped ACPI method
* @w: Pointer to the struct wmi_device identified by %WMI_BRIGHTNESS_GUID
@@ -91,7 +95,7 @@ static int nvidia_wmi_ec_backlight_probe(struct wmi_device *wdev, const void *ct
int ret;
/* drivers/acpi/video_detect.c also checks that SOURCE == EC */
- if (acpi_video_get_backlight_type() != acpi_backlight_nvidia_wmi_ec)
+ if (!force && acpi_video_get_backlight_type() != acpi_backlight_nvidia_wmi_ec)
return -ENODEV;
/*
diff --git a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
index d233c24ea342..e2b8b3437c58 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
@@ -491,6 +491,11 @@ static void ext4_sb_release(struct kobject *kobj)
complete(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
}
+static void ext4_feat_release(struct kobject *kobj)
+{
+ kfree(kobj);
+}
+
static const struct sysfs_ops ext4_attr_ops = {
.show = ext4_attr_show,
.store = ext4_attr_store,
@@ -505,7 +510,7 @@ static struct kobj_type ext4_sb_ktype = {
static struct kobj_type ext4_feat_ktype = {
.default_groups = ext4_feat_groups,
.sysfs_ops = &ext4_attr_ops,
- .release = (void (*)(struct kobject *))kfree,
+ .release = ext4_feat_release,
};
void ext4_notify_error_sysfs(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index c1e79f72cd89..9f0af4f116d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
struct task_struct;
+#ifndef barrier_nospec
+# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
* @index: array element index
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index ba3fff17e2f9..f9c3b1033ec3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
#include <linux/nodemask.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h>
#include <asm/barrier.h>
@@ -1910,9 +1911,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
* reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
* happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
barrier_nospec();
-#endif
CONT;
#define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE) \
STX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c
index 1505a52f23a0..d29fe29c6849 100644
--- a/lib/usercopy.c
+++ b/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/instrumented.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
/* out-of-line parts */
@@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n
unsigned long res = n;
might_fault();
if (!should_fail_usercopy() && likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
+ /*
+ * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
+ * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
+ * finished:
+ */
+ barrier_nospec();
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 53baa95cb644..0f295961e773 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ endmenu
config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
+ # Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
+ # Clang 16 due to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349
+ depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000
choice
prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
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